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DON QUIXOTE OR DARTH VADER?
PRESIDENT TRUMP'S VIEWS ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
STUART FORD*
ABSTRACT

This Article explores President Trump's views on international
humanitarian law (IHL) - the body of rules that regulates the conduct of
parties involved in an armed conflict. His beliefs are unlike those of any
modern President. He has repeatedly called for actions that everyone,
including his own administration, agree constitute war crimes. For
example, he has calledfor the U.S. to torture its enemies, has threatened to
kill the family members of enemy combatants, has praisedthe execution of
prisoners by U.S. soldiers, has threatened to attack cultural heritage sites
in Iran, and has said he wants to pillage Syria's natural resources. These
are all acts that have been recognized as crimesfor at least 100 years. In
effect, President Trump wants to do away with IHL and revert to a legal
regime of "might makes right" during armed conflicts. Luckily, he has
failed dismally. There are numerous reasons for this failure, including
President Trump's ignorance about international law, his disdain for
expertise, and his lack of planning and follow-through. But the most
important reason he has failed to remake IHL is that he hasfundamentally
under-estimatedIHL's resilience. It is deeply embedded in law and culture
in the United States, particularlywithin the U.S. military. It is also deeply
embedded within internationallaw. As a result, the President has made
some incendiarystatements but has failed to make any meaningful changes
to IHL.
Keywords: international law, international humanitarian law, law of
war, President Trump, pillage, collective punishment, cultural heritage,
principle of distinction, torture
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has already been written about President Trump's "America First"
policy and its effect on international law.' This Article builds on that earlier
literature by focusing on the President's views on international
humanitarian law (IHL).2 International humanitarian law is that part of
international law that regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed
conflict.' The most famous part of IHL is probably the Third Geneva
Convention, which protects prisoners of war (POWs),4 but f-IL is
considerably broader than just the protection of POWs. It also governs the
treatment of civilians,5 as well as when and how force can be used during

1 See e.g., Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administrationand the "Unmaking" of

International Agreements, 59 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443 (2018); Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump
Administration and InternationalLaw, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 413 (2017); Jack Goldsmith, The Trump
Onslaught on InternationalLaw and InternationalInstitutions, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2017, 10:09 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-onslaught-international-law-and-institutions; Adam Chilton, Has
Trump's PromisedAssault on InternationalLaw Materialized?,U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2017),
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/has-trumps-promised-assault-on-internationallaw-materialized/. In addition, the Case Western Reserve Journal ofInternationalLaw devoted an entire

symposium issue to the topic of "International Law and Policy in the Age of Trump." See Michael P.
Scharf & John G. Wrench, Foreword:InternationalLaw and Policy in the Age of Trump, 51 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (2019).
2 In contrast to the literature about international law generally, much less has been written about

President Trump's effect on IHL. The author has only found a single article directly addressing President
Trump's effect on fHL, and it was focused on his first 100 days in office. See Lesley Wexler, The Role
of "America First" in the Laws of War: President Trump's First 100 Days, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE
(Apr. 29, 2017), https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/the-role-of-america-first-inthe-laws-of-war/.
3 See ROBERT CRYER, DARRYL ROBINSON & SERGEY VASILIEV, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 259-61 (4th ed.). IHL is distinct from the body of
law that regulates whether the resort to hostilities is permitted. See id. at 261; INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS,
What are the jus ad bellum and jus in bello? (Jan. 22, 2015),

https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0.
4 There are four Geneva Conventions. The treatment of POWs is the focus of Geneva Convention
III. See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
5 The treatment of civilians during armed conflicts is the subject of Geneva Convention IV. See

Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
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an armed conflict.6 It determines which targets may be attacked7 and what
weapons may be used to attack them.8 As a result, IHL is of critical
importance for any military9 and serves as the normative foundation for key
components of international criminal law. 10 For these reasons, the rules of
IHL are almost universally recognized as important, particularly among
combatants."
But why focus on President Donald Trump's beliefs about IHL? The

6 The branch of IHL that deals with how force can be used during an armed conflict is sometimes
referred to as Hague Law because it was originally codified in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907.
See CRYER
ET AL., supra note 3, at 260 ("Since then [the 1860s], there have been many treaties developing

IHL. These are sometimes divided into 'Hague Law' and 'Geneva Law.' The Hague Conventions limit
the methods and means of warfare, in order to reduce unnecessary destruction and suffering. The most

important of these is the 1907 Hague Regulations, which recognized that 'the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,' and laid down many of the provisions on the means
and methods of warfare that are now recognized as customary law.").
7 See, e.g., JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUSIE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOLUME 1 Rule 7 (2009), Rule 7 ("The parties to the conflict must at all times

distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against
military objectives.").
8 Id. Rule 17 ("Each party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in the choice of means
and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of

civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects."); id. at 58 (noting that compliance with
this obligation may require consideration of "the selection of means of warfare proportionate to the
target, the use of precision weapons and target selection"). In this regard, the U.S. military acknowledges
that some weapons may be unlawful in particular circumstances if they produce "incidental effects" that
are "excessive compared to the military advantages expected to be gained from the attack." See OFF. OF
GEN. COUNS. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, § 6.7.4 (June 2015,
updated Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. The military

explicitly acknowledges that this limitation on how weapons can be used stems from THL's principle of
proportionality. Id.
9 Militaries must understand IHL so that they can make decisions about which targets can lawfully
be attacked and which weapons systems can be used to attack them. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1 (discussing the importance of compliance with IHL to the

operation of the U.S. military).
10 IHL serves as the foundation for war crimes. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 263 ("War
crimes criminalizes only a subset of the rules of IHL. The major question is which rules of IHL constitute
a criminal offence when violated."). Not all violations of IHL constitute war crimes, but the most serious
ones do. Id. at 265 (noting that violation of the "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions
does constitute a war crime). War crimes is one of the core crimes at the heart of international criminal
law. For example, the International Criminal Court is designed to investigate and prosecute "the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community" and it has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and aggression. See Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court pmbl.,

July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002); Id. art. 8.
11 See Daniel Munoz-Rojas & Jean-Jacques Fr6sard, The Roots ofBehavior in War: Understanding
and Preventing IHL Violations, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 189, 191 (2004) ("IHL has a universal
character, in that both civilians and combatants in very varied countries which have experienced different
forms of armed conflicts acknowledge and adhere to humanitarian principles."); DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, § 2.6 (describing the importance of honor and respect

for the rules of IHL to the conduct of the military).

2021]

DON QUIXOTE OR DARTH VADER?

49

President does not like complexity, 2 disdains expertise,1 3 and does not have
any military experience.' 4 So why do his views on IHL matter? First, he is
the elected leader of the world's second largest economy" which makes him
one of the most powerful individuals on Earth.1 6 Thus, in a general sense,
what President Trump believes matters simply because he is President of
the United States of America. This is especially true with regards to IHL
because the U.S. Constitution designates him the Commander in Chief of
the armed forces of the United States. 7 This gives him control over the day
to day operations of the U.S. military, 8 which is the most powerful military

12 Consistent reporting indicates the President does not like nuance or detail and prefers not to

engage deeply with complex problems. See, e.g., Michelle Mark, Trump Doesn't Read His Intelligence
Reports, But Looks at the Graphs, Charts, and Tables, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-looks-at-charts-in-intelligence-briefings-2020-5
(noting that
President Trump struggles to focus during his intelligence briefings and frequently ignores information
he disagrees with); Julian E. Barnes & Adam Goldman, ForSpy Agencies, Briefing Trump Is a Test of
Holding
His
Attention,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
21,
2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/us/politics/presidents-daily-brief-trump.html (noting that the
President has a short attention span and rarely, if ever, reads intelligence reports); Carol D. Leonnig,
Shane Harris & Greg Jaffe, Breaking with Tradition, Trump Skips President's Written Intelligence
Report
and
Relies
on
Oral
Briefings,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
9,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/breaking-with-tradition-trump-skips-presidents-written-

intelligence-report-for-oral-briefings/2018/02/09/b7ba569e-Oc52-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef story.html
(noting that Donald Trump "rarely if ever reads the President's Daily Brief, a document that lays out the
most pressing information collected by U.S. intelligence agencies").
13 See Stephen Collinson, Trump Turns Angry and Defensive as Evidence Contradicts His
Coronavirus Narrative, CNN (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/06/politics/donald-trump-

coronavirus-angry-defensive/index.html; Tom Nichols, In Trump's World, Reality is Negotiable,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/donald-trump-rejectsexpertise/579808/.
14 President Trump received five draft deferments that allowed him to avoid serving in the military
during the Vietnam War. See Steve Eder & Dave Philipps, DonaldTrump's DraftDeferments: Fourfor
College,
One
for
Bad
Feet,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2016),

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/politics/donald-trump-draft-record.html.
15 See CIA, The World Factbook, Country Comparison:GDP(PurchasingPower Parity),available

at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/208rank.html.
16 For example, according to Forbes, the three most powerful people in the world are the leaders of
China, Russia, and the United States. See David M. Ewalt, The World's Most Powerful People 2018,
FORBES (May
8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2018/05/08/the-worlds-mostpowerful-people-2018/#4c96f0966c47. See also The World's Most Powerful People, FORBES,

https://www.forbes.com/powerful-people/list/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
17 See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States .... ").
18 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Drone On: The Commander in Chief Power to Target and Kill

Americans, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 51 (2015) ("The Commander in Chief Clause does not
authorize the President to declare or initiate a condition of war, but it does give the President plenary
power to conduct war. That includes all matters of military strategy and tactics, all rules of engagement
with the enemy, all choices concerning the use of available weaponry, all decisions with respect to
military objectives and targets, and all matters concerning the capture, detention, interrogation, and
military punishment ofenemy combatants."); David Lapan, President Trump Is DamagingOurMilitary:
War Crimes Cases Are the Latest Example, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 18, 2019),
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in the world.1 9 Given the President's role as Commander-in-Chief of the
world's most powerful military and the importance of IHL to the operation
of every military, his views on IHL matter.
Second, the President's views on IHL are important because they are so
anomalous.2 0 They are unlike the views of any other modern U.S.
President. 21 While previous Presidents have taken positions on IHL that
have been controversial, 22 President Trump has regularly proposed actions
that almost everyone, including the U.S. government, agrees are violations
24
of 1HL. 23 In many cases, those actions would also constitute war crimes.
25
For example, the President has repeatedly called for the use of torture.
Torture, when committed in the context of an armed conflict, is universally
recognized as a war crime. 26 The President has also proposed other acts that
would be war crimes, including intentionally killing the family members of
enemy combatants 27 and deliberately attacking cultural heritage sites to
punish an enemy. 28 His views are unprecedented for an American President.
The President, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the armed
29
forces, has enormous control over the U.S. military. Thus, the President
appears to be in a good position to implement his views about IHL within
the U.S. military. Yet, the President has often been unable to turn his vision
of IHL into action. 30 For example, the President retreated from his initial

https://www.justsecurity.org/67310/president-trump-is-damaging-our-military-war-crimes-cases-arethe-latest-example/ ("By our Constitution, the president serves as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces and has wide latitude in his authority to make decisions and order their actions."); see also Stuart
Ford, Has President Trump Committed a War Crime By Pardoning War Criminals?, 35 AM. UNIV.

INT'L L. REV. 757, 766-69, 778 (2020) (describing the President's authority over U.S. armed forces).
19 See Ellen loanes, This Is How the US and Iran Rank Among the World's 25 Most Powerful
Militaries, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-

the-world-ranked-2019-9.
20 Every President's views on IHL are important, simply because of who the President is, but
President Trump's views are particularly important because of how unusual they are. See infra Section

VI(G) (describing the President's desire to violate the fundamental principles of IHL).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 344-351. Indeed, many of the President's proposals would
have been illegal by the mid nineteenth century, if not earlier. See infra text accompanying notes 334335.
22 See infra text accompanying note 345.
23 See infra Section VI.G.
24 Id. Not every violation of IHL is a war crime, but the most serious violations of IHL qualify as
war crimes. See CRYER ET AL., supranote 3, at 263 (noting that war crimes criminalize "only a subset

of the rules of IHL"); id. at 263-264 (noting that only the most serious violations of IHL constitute war
crimes).
25 See infra Section VI.B.
26 Id.
27 See infra Section VI.C.
28 See infra Section VI.F.
29 See supra text accompanying note 18.

30 See infra Section VII.
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desire to bomb cultural heritage sites in Iran after pushback from senior
members of his administration 31 and the President has been unable to
implement his plans to torture our enemies. 2 Despite a number of failures,
however, President Trump has sometimes been able to take action. For
example, the President pardoned several members of the U.S. military who
were either accused of or had been convicted of war crimes despite
opposition from within the military and his administration. 33 Understanding
President Trump's views on IHL, as well as when and how he is able to
implement them, is thus very important in understanding what effect he is
likely to have on IHL.
This Article has three goals. First, it seeks to understand the President's
views on IHL by looking at his public statements about issues related to
IHL. While the President has never publicly articulated a coherent vision
of IHL, his statements and actions are guided by certain beliefs about IHL.
His statements reflect a consistent worldview in which international law is
imposed on the United States to weaken it34 and the indiscriminate use of
violence is praiseworthy.35 Not surprisingly, this causes him to instinctively
reject the limitations imposed by IHL and he has repeatedly proposed
violating IHL.3 6 Second, this Article assesses the President's effect on IHL
so far. 37 When has he been successful in implementing his vision of IHL?
Why has he been unsuccessful so often? Finally, this Article looks at what
effect President Trump will have on the future of I1HL. 38 Can the President
succeed in remaking IHL to be consistent with his vision of it? Or is IHL
resilient enough to survive President Trump's attacks on it?
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the scope and
importance of IHL, while Section III explores the best way to understand
what President Trump believes about IHL. Sections IV and V explore the
President's views on international law and violence, respectively. Section
VI then uses the President's own statements to illuminate his views on IHTL.
The President's ability to turn his vision into action is evaluated in Section
VII and the consequences of the President's repeated attacks on IHL are
discussed in Section VIII, while Section IX summarizes this Article's

31 See infra Section VIF.
32 See infra Section VII.
33 /d.
34 See infra Section IV.
35 See infra Section V.

36 See infra Section VI.
37 See infra Section VII.
38 See infra Section VIII.
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conclusions.

II. BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
International humanitarian law regulates how force is used during an
armed conflict.39 Modern IHL has its origins in the nineteenth century. 0 In
1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued a set of instructions for how the
Union Army was to conduct itself during the Civil War. 41 This set of
instructions-known as the Lieber Code because it was written by the
influential political scientist and international lawyer Francis Lieber4 2-was
one of the earliest attempts to codify what was permissible during war and
set the stage for much of the development of IHL.4 3 The antecedents of
many of the key components of modern IHL can be seen in the Lieber Code,
including an early version of the principle of distinction." For this reason,
it is viewed as one of the most influential documents in the development of
modern IHL.4 5
IIHL continued to evolve during the second half of the nineteenth
century, 46 but the next major developments occurred at the turn of the
twentieth century, with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.47 The
Hague Conventions codified the rules that governed the means and methods

39 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 259-61.
40 Id. at 259-60 (noting that there have always been rules that regulate conflict but describing the
codification of modern IHL that began in the mid nineteenth century).
41 See Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber's Code and Principles of Humanity, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 269-70 (1997) (describing the genesis of the Lieber Code); see also FRANCIS LIEBER,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863).

42 See Meron, supra note 41 (describing the life and influence of Francis Lieber).
43 See Jenny Gesley, The "Lieber Code" - the First Modern Codification of the Laws of War,

Library of Congress, (Apr. 24, 2018), https://blogs.loc.govlaw/2018/04/the-lieber-code-the-firstmodern-codification-of-the-laws-of-war/.
44 See FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE FIELD Rule 15 (1863) (noting that militaries can attack "armed enemies" but that the "incidental"
deaths of "other persons" is only permitted when those deaths are "unavoidable"); id. Rule 22 ("The

principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person,
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit."); see also Meron, supra note 41, at

274-75 (noting that the Lieber Code incorporated a version of the principle of distinction).
45 See Gesley, supra note 43 ("The Lieber Code, however, presents the first modern comprehensive
codification of the laws and customs of war which greatly influenced subsequent codifications.");
Meron, supra note 41, at 278 ("Both the Code's high quality and its timing, written when no other
significant compilations of laws and customs of war were available, can explain its tremendous impact
on the codification of international humanitarian law."). On the other hand, it also described as lawful
several practices that would no longer be acceptable, including the starvation of civilians, and the refusal

to give quarter. Id. at 272-73.
46 Important late nineteenth century developments in IHL included the Brussels Declaration of
1874 and the Oxford Manual on the laws of war from 1880. See Meron, supra note 41, at 279.
47 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 260.
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of warfare. 48 For example, the 1899 Hague Convention contains one of the
bedrock principles of IHL: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited."4 9 This is an early incarnation of what
would later become known as the principle of humanity.50 The Hague
Conventions are important because they represented one of the earliest
attempts to enshrine the rules of war in international law.'" Ultimately,
fifty-one states became parties to the 1899 Convention.52
The next major advances to 1IL came after WWII with the adoption of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.5 3 While the Hague Conventions addressed
the means and methods of warfare, the Geneva Conventions spelled out
states' duties with respect to prisoners of war, non-combatants, and
combatants hors de combat.54 In particular, they contain detailed provisions
on the treatment of civilians.55 The Geneva Conventions principally apply

48 Id.
49 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) Annex art. 22,

July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague Convention II of 1899].
50 See infra text accompanying notes 75-78 (describing the principle of humanity).
51 See George H. Aldrich & Christine M. Chinkin, Symposium: The Hague Peace Conferences:

Introduction, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000) (noting that the 1899 Hague Peace Conference "achieved only
modest results in addressing the subject ...

of arms limitation, but it was unquestionably successful in

developing and codifying the . . . laws of war"). In contrast, the Lieber Code, which was undeniably
important, represented the views of a single country. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
52 See Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-

databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xspxpviewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xptreat
ySelected=150 (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). The vast majority of countries that ratified the 1899 Hague
Convention did so in the early twentieth century. Id.
53 There had been some advances in [HL during the interwar period. See Jean S. Pictet, The New
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 463 (1951). But the
events of WWII forced countries to recognize the inadequacies of the existing rules. Id. ("In 1945, at the
conclusion of a war without precedent, the complex and vital task had to be faced of completing and
amending the rules of international law in the humanitarian field, in the light of experience gathered
during hostilities."). The Geneva Conventions were the result. Id. at 464-68.
54 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 260. There are four Geneva Conventions. The treatment of
POWs is governed by Geneva Convention II. See Geneva Convention Ill, supra note 4. The Geneva
Conventions also deal with the treatment of soldiers who are hors de combat (Geneva Conventions I and

II)

and the protections of civilians during armed conflicts (Geneva Convention IV). See Geneva

Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the

Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 85; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 5.

55 See Pictet, supra note 53, at 473 (noting that WWII demonstrated the need for a specific set of
rules that governed the treatment of enemy civilians during armed conflicts). "The establishment of a
new Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Wartime was an imperative necessity. After the bitter
experiences of the last conflict and the horrors of the concentration camps, there was no need to stress
the urgency and capital importance of international rules in this particular field." Id. "Today there exists
a new convention as detailed as that for prisoners of war; it has been signed and its object is to prevent
a repetition of the tragic events of the second World War." Id.
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during international armed conflicts, 56 but they also provide some
The Geneva
protections during non-international armed conflicts.57
58
of
IH{L.
Conventions now form a key part
IHL has continued to develop since WWII and more recent
59
contributions include the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
Additional Protocol II, in particular, is important because it expands on the
protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and spells out
in more detail states' duties in non-international conflicts. 60 Collectively,
61
these and other treaties - like the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
Biological Weapons Convention, 62 and the Hague Convention on Cultural
Property 63 - as well as state practice,"4 comprise the body of international
humanitarian law.
Today, IHL is oriented around three limiting principles that underlie

56 By their own terms, they applied "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." See, e.g., Geneva Convention
III, supra note 4, art. 2. In other words, they applied in conflicts between two or more states, what we
would call today an international armed conflict.

57 Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contains identical language in Article 3 (often
called "Common Article 3" as a result). Common Article 3 applies "[i]n the case of armed conflict not
of an international character" (i.e., in non-international armed conflicts) and prohibits "violence to life
and person, in particular murder, of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" directed at
individuals "taking no active part in hostilities." See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supranote 4, art. 3;
see also Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT'L

REV. RED CROSS 189 (2011) (describing the scope and effect of Common Article 3).
58 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 7, at xv (noting that the Geneva Conventions
represent the "foundation of international humanitarian law in force today").
59 There are three Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Protocol I provides additional protections
that apply during international armed conflicts. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Jun 8, 1977,

1125 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Protocol II codifies the protections that apply during noninternational armed conflicts. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125

U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. Protocol III adds an additional distinctive emblem that is entitled
to protection under the Geneva Conventions. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12

August 1949 and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 2404
U.N.T.S 261.
60 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 260.
61 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
62 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, April 10, 1972, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163.
63 See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,

1954, 249 U.N.T.S 215 [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property].
64 Much of IHL is now customary international law and one of the key features of customary
international law is a consistent state practice. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art.

38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (describing customary international
law as requiring a "general practice accepted as law" by states). Consequently, state practice is a crucial

part of IHL.
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many of the specific rules. 65 They are the principle of distinction, the
principle of proportionality and the principle of humanity. 66 The principle
of distinction requires that combatants distinguish between (1) civilians and
civilian objects and (2) combatants and military objectives. 67 Combatants
may never deliberately target civilians or civilian objects. 68 Combatants
may only attack other combatants and military objectives.69
The principle of proportionality requires combatants to consider the
consequences for civilians and civilian objects even when attacking
legitimate military objectives. 70 For an attack on a military objective to
comply with the principle of proportionality, the expected collateral damage
to civilians and civilian objects cannot be disproportionately large relative
to the expected military advantage to be gained from the attack. 71 This does
not prohibit civilian casualties during armed conflicts,7 2 but it forces
militaries to consider the consequences of their actions for civilians,7 3 and
it prohibits some attacks, where the expected collateral damage is
disproportionately large relative to the expected military advantage to be
gained from the attack. 74

65 There is a fourth principle in IHL, but it is not a limiting principle. The principle of military
necessity permits uses of force that are necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective. See

Military Necessity, ICRC, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-necessity (last visited Jan. 13,
2021). While the principle of military necessity authorizes the use of force, the other principles impose

limits on those uses of force. THL is largely organized around the limits imposed by the principles of
distinction, proportionality and humanity. Id. (noting that the "purpose" of IHL is to "strike a balance
between military necessity" and humanitarian concerns).
66 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 260-61 (discussing the key principles of IHL).
67 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 7, Rule 1 ("The parties to the conflict must at
all times distinguish between civilian and combatants."); id. Rule 7 ("The parties to the conflict must at
all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives.").
68 Id. Rule 1 ("Attacks must not be directed against civilians."); id. Rule 7 ("Attacks must not be

directed against civilian objects.").
69 Id. Rule 1 ("Attacks may only be directed against combatants."); id. Rule 7 ("Attacks may only
be directed against military objectives.").

70 See id. Rule 14 ("Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.").
71 Id.
72 See e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, § 2.4.1.2 ("In war,
incidental damage to the civilian population and civilian objects is unfortunate and tragic, but inevitable.

Thus, applying the principle of proportionality in conducting attacks does not require that no incidental
damage result from attacks.").
73 Id. (noting that the U.S. military must "take feasible precautions in planning and conducting

attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians" and civilian objects).
74 Id. ("[T]his principle creates obligations to refrain from attacks in which the expected harm
incidental to such attacks would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated to be gained.").
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The principle of humanity bars some means and methods of warfare
because of the unnecessary suffering they impose. 75 One of the earliest
examples of the principle of humanity is the 1868 Declaration of St.
Petersburg, which banned exploding bullets because they "uselessly
76
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable."
It can also be seen in the 1899 Hague Convention's statement that states'
77
The bans
right "to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."
on chemical and biological weapons are modern expressions of the principle
of humanity.7 8
Today, IHL is a cornerstone of international law. The Geneva
79
Conventions have been signed and ratified by nearly every country. Much
of IHL has been recognized as forming part of customary international
law,80 and 123 countries have become members of the International
Criminal Court 1 - a court dedicated to providing a global forum for
82
punishing serious violations of international law, including war crimes.
The U.S. military is also deeply committed to IHL and many of IHL's rules
are incorporated into U.S. law.8 3 It is thus surprising to see a U.S. President
argue for so many blatant violations of IHL.

75 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 7, Rule 70 ("The use of means and methods
of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.").

76 See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 298. The Declaration acknowledges that the purpose
of conflict is "weaken the military forces of the enemy" and that this includes "disabl[ing] the greatest
possible number of men," but it simultaneously bars exploding bullets because such bullets "uselessly
aggravate the suffering" of those wounded by them. Id. It goes on to conclude that this "useless"
aggravation of the suffering of the wounded is "contrary to the laws of humanity." Id.
77 See supra text accompanying note 49.
78 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 7, Rule 73 ("The use of biological weapons is

prohibited."); id. Rule 74 ("The use of chemical weapons is prohibited.").
79 For example, the first Geneva Convention of 1949 has 196 state parties. See Treaties, States
https://ihlCROSS,
RED
THE
OF
COMM.
INT'L
Commentaries,
Parties and

databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xspxp.viewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xp_treat
ySelected=365 (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (list of signatories to the first Geneva Convention). The United
States signed the treaty in 1949 and ratified it in 1955. Id.
80 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 260 (noting that much of the Hague Regulations and the 1949

Geneva Conventions, as well as some of the key parts of the Additional Protocols have become part of
customary international law).
81 See International Criminal Court, The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT.,

https://asp.icccpi.int/enmenus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%

2

0stat

ute.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
82 See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8 (granting the ICC authority to punish war crimes); id.
pmbl. (noting that the court was established to provide "an independent permanent International
Criminal Court . . . with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community").
83 See infra Section VII.
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III. HOW TO DETERMINE THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON IHL

This Article explores the President's "views" on international
humanitarian law. 84 It focuses on the beliefs of the President himself, rather
than on the official policy of the U.S. government. 85 This is an important
distinction because the President's personal beliefs often appear to be
significantly different from the official position of his government. 86 For
example, the President has repeatedly called for the use of torture87 even
though U.S. law explicitly prohibits torture. 88 Indeed, President Trump's
beliefs about IL are essentially unique amongst modern U.S. Presidents. 89
He has a radical view of IHL that would replace a carefully constructed
rules-based international order with a "might makes right" free-for-all. 90
This view is fundamentally at odds with the official position of the U.S.
military.'" It is precisely this difference between the government's official
positions and the President's personal beliefs that makes this Article so
important.
If what President Trump believes matters, the next question then
becomes what is the best way to understand what President Trump believes?
One possibility is to look at the official statements issued in his name.
Another possibility is to look at his unscripted personal statements.9 2 This
Article focuses on the President's extemporaneous personal statements
rather than his official statements because his personal statements offer a
more accurate account of his beliefs than the administration's carefully

84 The word "views" is in quotations here because it is not clear how to describe the President's

beliefs about

IHL.

He does not have a coherent theory about IHL. See infra Section VI.A. Indeed, he

often does not seem to understand IHL at all. See infra Section VI.G. On the other hand, he does have
some consistent beliefs that underlie his responses to IHL. First, he admires violence. See infra Section
V. Second, he rejects rules or laws that try to circumscribe his power. See infra Section IV. These beliefs

predispose him to reject the strictures of IHL. See infra Section VIA.
85 See supra Section I (explaining why the President's beliefs about IHL are important).
86 See generally infra Section VI.
87 See infra Section VI.B.

88 Id.
89 See infra Section VIG.
90 Id.
91 See infra Section VIII.
92 When this Article uses the phrase "personal statement" it refers to the sort of extemporaneous
statements that the President is famous for rather than the more carefully constructed and vetted official
statements that are also issued in his name. See infra text accompanying notes 93-98 (highlighting the
differences between the President's scripted and unscripted comments).
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vetted official statements. 93 Indeed, his official statements often act as
damage control for his unscripted remarks. 94 For example, the President has
repeatedly endorsed torture in his personal statements. 95 On at least one
occasion, in response to criticism, he issued an official statement where he
said he would be "bound by laws and treaties" if he became President and
that he would not "order our military or other officials to violate those
laws." 96 Almost immediately afterwards, however, he went back to
promising to use torture in his personal statements. 97 As his repeated
personal statements make clear, the official statement issued in his name
does not reflect President Trump's beliefs about torture. Rather, the
extemporaneous statements he makes at campaign rallies and other
98
For
appearances seem to offer a more accurate window into his beliefs.
this reason, this Article will try to understand President Trump's beliefs
about H-IL as demonstrated by his unscripted personal statements. The next
Sections will explore those beliefs.
IV. THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

IHL is a branch of international law and the President's views on IHL
are informed by his views on international law more generally. This section
looks at those views.

93 See Mary Newman, Trump: Unscripted v. Scripted, PoLITICO (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:06 PM),
New
https://www.politico.com/video/2019/01/31/what-happens-when-trump-goes-off-script-067658;
York Times, A Tale of Two Trumps: Scripted vs. Unscripted, YOUTUBE (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzhPcQsj3dk&list=PL4CGYNsoW2iBfrL3yvnqQqCMdiBQo

ID

&index=132.
94 See sources cited supra note 93.

95 See infra Section VI.B..
96 See Ryan Brown & Nicole Gaouette, Donald Trump Reverses Position on Torture, Killing
Terrorists' Families, CNN (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/politics/donald-trumpreverses-on-torture/.

97 See infra text accompanying notes 214-217.
98 Cf Roger Cohen, Opinion, Truth, Lies and Numbness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/opinion/trump-truth-lies.html

("There's

the scripted

Trump

voice, which is fake. There's the unscripted voice, which is genuine."); David A. Graham, How to Tell
Which Donald Trump
Will Deliver a Speech,
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
24,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/trump-having-fun/537804/

differences between his scripted and unscripted remarks).

(noting

the

DON QUIXOTE OR DARTH VADER?

2021]

A.

59

An "America First"Foreign Policy

President Trump entered office with a transactional, "America First" 99
approach to foreign policy. "My foreign policy will always put the interests
of the American people and American security above all else . .. 'America
First' will be the major and overriding theme of my administration." 100 As
part of his America First policy, he attacked the "false song of globalism"
and said he was "skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring
America down."1 0 1 He vowed that he would "never enter America into any
agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs."'o2
This transactional approach has led the President to see the United
States' international relationships as a zero-sum game in which the U.S.
must "win" each relationship. So, for example, President Trump argued that
the United States cannot afford to "be the policeman of the world,"1 03 and
the U.S. should not protect its allies unless they paid for that protection.104
He accused China of taking economic advantage of the United States' 0 5 and
denounced the "bad trade deals" that permitted this outcome.' 06 He attacked
NATO as "unfair economically" to the United States because it "helps
[other NATO members] more so than the United States."1 07 More generally,
he embraced a worldview in which the United States has been "disrespected,
mocked and ripped off for many many years" by other countries, including
our own allies, and he vowed "we [would] not be ripped off anymore."1 08

99 As others have noted, the use of "America First" as a slogan bears striking similarities to the
America First Committee, an anti-Semitic, pro-fascist group from the

1940s. See Ronen

Ziv, Amanda

&

Graham & Liqun Cao, America First? Trump, Crime, and Justice Internationally, 14 VICTIMS
OFFENDERS 997, 998 (2019).
100 See Jose A. Del Real, Trump, Pivoting to the GeneralElection, Hones 'AmericaFirst' Foreign
Policy Vision, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/04/27/trump-pivoting-to-the-general-election-hones-america-first-foreign-poicyvision/.

101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Transcript:Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html.
104 Id. ("We are not being reimbursed for our protection of many of the countries that you'll be
talking about .... I would say at a minimum we have to be reimbursed, substantially reimbursed ....
Because we are not being reimbursed for the kind of tremendous service that we're performing by
protecting various countries.").
105 Id. ("China's been taking advantage of us for many, many years and we can't allow it to go

on.").
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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The United Nations and Other InternationalOrganizations

Given his "America First" views, it is not surprising that the President
has been highly critical of international organizations and multilateral
solutions to problems.1 09 For example, he has criticized the United Nations
as a pernicious global government. In his address to the 7 3 rd session of the
United Nations General Assembly in 2018, he said that the United States
would always choose "independence" over "global governance, control,
and domination."" 0 He went on to say that America would "defend" itself
He made similar
against the threat posed by "global governance.""'
statements a year later when he addressed the 7 4 ' Session of the General
Assembly.1 2 In other contexts, he has claimed that the UN is weak and
incompetent, "not a friend" of the United States, and that it causes problems
rather than solves them." 3 He has also refused to pay the United States'
UN dues." 4
A variety of other international organizations and multilateral
agreements have also come in for criticism, including NATO, the
International Criminal Court, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the World
Health Organization. President Trump rocked NATO in 2016 when he
suggested it was "obsolete"'5 and the United States would only come to the
aid of other NATO countries if those countries had "fulfilled their
obligations to us."" 6 He attacked the International Criminal Court as

109 See Goldsmith, supra note 1 (describing President Trump's attacks on international
institutions); Amifar & Singh, supra note 1, at 443 (noting that President Trump has embraced
"skepticism of, if not outright hostility to, the rules-based, interconnected international order that the

United States has played a central role in painstakingly constructing since World War 11").
110 He claimed that the United States was "by far, the world's most powerful nation," and then
went on to say that "[t]he future does not belong to globalists ... [t]he future belongs to sovereign and

independent nations .... " See Donald J. Trump, President, U.S., Remarks by President Trump to the
73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2018), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-

nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.
111 Id.
112 See Donald J. Trump, President, U.S., Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the
United Nations General Assembly (Sep. 24, 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/.
113 Jill Colvin, 'Not a Friendof Democracy': Trump's Past UN Criticism, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18,
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-not-a-friend-of-democracy-trumps-past-un-criticism-2017-

9.
114 See John Fritze and Deirdre Shesgreen, Pay freeze at the UN? Trump administration owes the
United
Nations
$1
billion,
USA
Today,
Oct.
9,
2019,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/09/donald-trump-dismisses-united-nations-

deficits-says-others-should-pay/3917554002/.
115 See Transcript:Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views, supra note 103.
116 See David E. Sanger & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Sets Conditionsfor Defending NATO
Allies
Against
Attack,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
20,
2016),
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lacking legitimacy and authority and pledged that the United States would
never surrender to an "unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy." 117 He
lambasted the Paris Climate Agreement as a "total disaster" and gave notice
that he plans to withdraw from it." 8 Most recently, in the midst of a global
pandemic, he denounced the World Health Organization, threatened to stop
funding it,1 9 and has begun the process of withdrawing from it.' 2 0
C. MultilateralTrade Agreements
President Trump also vehemently dislikes multilateral trade agreements.
Prior to withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 121 Trump derided
it as the "continuing rape of our country."122 He said the World Trade
Organization is "unfair"123 to the U.S. and "needs drastic change."124 He
claimed that the agreement to establish the WTO was the "single worst trade
deal ever made" and threatened to withdraw from it. 125 He also blocked
appointments to the WTO's appeal body, effectively crippling the
organization. 126 Similarly, he described the North American Free Trade

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/politics/donald-trump-issues.html.

117 Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
supranote 1 10.
118 See Brady Dennis, Trump Makes It Official: U.S. Will Withdrawfrom the ParisClimate Accord,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate4,
2019),
(Nov.
POST
WASH.
environment/2019/ 1/04/trump-makes-it-official-us-will-withdraw-paris-climate-accord/.

119 See Laurel Wamsley, Trump Criticizes WHO and Threatens to Pull U.S. Funding, NPR (April
2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/07/829244345/trump7,
criticizes-who-and-threatens-to-pull-u-s-funding; Michael D. Shear & Donald G. McNeil Jr., Criticized
for Pandemic Response, Trump Tries Shifting Blame to the W.H.O., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-who-funding.html.

More recently,

President Trump has begun the process for withdrawing from the WHO. Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of
State, Update on U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization (Sept. 3, 2020), available at
https://www.state.gov/update-on-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-world-health-organization/.
120 See Zachary Cohen, Jennifer Hansler, Kylie Atwood, Vivian Salama & Sara Murray, Trump
Administration Begins Formal Withdrawalfrom World Health Organization,CNN (last updated July 8,

2020,

4:53

AM),

https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/politics/us-withdrawing-world-health-

organization/index.html
121 See Trump Executive Order Pulls out of TPP Trade Deal, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017),

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38721056.
122 See Cristiano Lima, Trump Calls Trade Deal 'A Rape of Our Country', POLITICO (June 28,
2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-trans-pacific-partnership-224916.
123 See Jessica Dye, Trump Calls WTO 'Unfair' to US in Latest Trade Bard, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 6,

2018), https://www.ft.com/content/afce06d0-39aa-1le8-8eee-e06bde0 l c544.
124 Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
supranote 112.
125 See Trump Threatens to Pull out of World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45364150.

126 See Ana Swanson, Trump Cripples WTO as Trade War Rages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2019),
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Agreement (NAFTA) as "the worst trade deal maybe ever signed
anywhere."12 1
D. International Human Rights
President Trump does not support human rights 128 and lavishes praise on
authoritarian leaders who routinely violate those rights. 12 9 For example, he
praised President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines for doing an
"unbelievable job on the drug problem" in his country.13 0 President Duterte
is best known for initiating a war on drugs that has killed thousands of
people and featured large-scale extrajudicial killings."' This led to so many
killings by the police that the International Criminal Court has opened a
preliminary investigation into possible crimes against humanity committed
in the Philippines.1 32
Likewise, President Trump seems to admire North Korean leader Kim
Jong-Un, a brutal dictator who has systematically abused, starved and killed
his citizens in huge numbers.133 He said that he "fell in love" with North

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/business/trump-trade-war-wto.html.
127 See Trump Threatens to Pull out of World Trade Organization, supra note 125.

128 See Ziv et al., supra note 99, at 1001 (noting that President Tump has preferred to "ignore many
of the human rights violations occurring around the world - unless otherwise pressured - opting for

these countries to handle the issues internally"); Koh, supra note

1,

at 430-31 (describing the Trump

administration's disdain for human rights). For example, in one interview the President said that the
United States should not criticize other countries' human rights records and that he would only act
internationally when it was in America's direct interest to do so. See David E. Sanger & Maggie

Haberman, Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATOAllies Against Attack, N.Y. TIMES (July
20,

2016),

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/politics/donald-trump-issues.html;

Donald Trump on NATO,

Transcript:

Turkey's Coup Attempt and the World, N.Y. Times, (July 21, 2016),

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html.
129 See Chris Cilizza & Brenna Williams, 15 Times Donald Trump Has Praised Authoritarian
Rulers, CNN POLITICS (July 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/02/politics/donald-trumpdictators-kim-jong-un-vladimir-putin/index.html.
130 See Transcript of Call Between President Trump and Philippine President Duterte, WASH.

POST (last visited Jan. 13, 2021), https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/politics/transcript-ofcall-between-president-trump-and-philippine-president-duterte/2446/ (call took place on April 29,
2017); see also Ziv et al., supra note 99, at 1002 (noting that President Trump has been "warm and

supportive" towards President Duterte while "ignoring [the] atrocities" committed during the Philippine
President's war on drugs).
131 See Lindsay Murdoch, Australia Slams Philippines President over Drug Killings, SYDNEY
MORNING

HERALD

(May

9,

2017),

https://www.smh.com.au/world/australia-slams-philippines-

president-over-drug-killings-20170509-gw0hbh.html.
132 See INT'L CRIM. CT., Off. OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES 2018at

15-18 (2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf.
133 See Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7,
2014); see also Ziv et al., supra note 99, at 1002 (noting President Trump's "meetings with and adoration
of' Kim Jong-Un despite North Korea's well-known mistreatment of its own citizens).
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Korean leader Kim Jong-Un after exchanging several "beautiful letters" and
then meeting with him. 3 4 In another interview, he said that the people of
North Korea love Kim Jong-Un and implied that he personally trusted the
North Korean leader.' 35
President Trump also likes President Xi of China.' 36 For example, he
has said that he has "unlimited" respect and friendship for President Xi of
China.13 On another occasion he described President Xi as "great" and a
"great gentleman" and said it would be "great" if President Xi could become
"president for life" of China.1 38 China has a poor human rights record.
Since 2017, China has detained more than a million members of the Uighur
ethnic group in hundreds of camps in Xinjiang province.' 3 9 Detainees are
forced to renounce Islam and pledge loyalty to the Communist Party, while
they are continually monitored for disloyalty. 4 0 Most have never been
While members of his administration have
charged with a crime."'
criticized China's treatment of its Uighur minority, President Trump has
remained largely silent on the issue. 4 2 In fact, according to one former
advisor, President Trump actually encouraged the Chinese President to
build the camps.14 3
President Trump seems to similarly admire President Putin of Russia.
President Trump described President Putin of Russia as a leader who has

134
See
Trump
on
Kim
Jong-Un, ASSOCIATED
https://apnews.com/article/4d56f6e8f99d4eefb2f22b7a6dd072d0.

PRESS

(Sep.

30,

2018),

135 See PresidentTrump sits down with George Stephanopoulos: Transcript, ABC NEWS (June 12,
2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-trump-sits-george-stephanopoulostranscript/story?id=55831055.
136 See Cillizza & Williams, supra note 129; Domenico Montanaro, 6 Strongmen Trump Has

Praised

-

And

the

Conflict

It

Presents,

NPR

(May

2,

2017),

https://www.npr.org/2017/05/02/526520042/6-strongmen-trumps-praised-and-the-conflicts-it-presents.
137 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 14, 2019, 6:16 AM),

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1 128257891805298690.
138 See David Shepardson, Trump Praises Chinese President Extending Tenure 'For Life',
REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-china/trump-praises-chinese-

president-extending-tenure-for-life-idUSKCN1 GG015.
139 See Lindsay Maizland, China'sRepression of UighursinXinjiang, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(last updated June 30, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See Jane Perlez, China Wants the World to Stay Silent on Muslim Camps. Its Succeeding., N.Y.

TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslim-

camps.html;

Tara Francis Chan, Donald Trump Accused of 'Compromising' Efforts to End China's
Abuses in Xinjiang, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/xinjiang-uighur-donald-

trump-mike-pompeo-hearing-1466295.
143 See Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, Don't Buy John Bolton's Book. But Don't Ignore Its
Revelations, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/opinion/trump-johnbolton-book.html (quoting John Bolton).
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"strong control" over his country.'4 He also praised President Putin's 82%
approval rating and said that President Putin was "far more" of a leader than
President Obama. 45 Under Putin, Russia illegally invaded and annexed
Crimea, 4 6 and has an extremely poor human rights record. 147 Overall,
President Trump seems to prefer authoritarian leaders.1 4 8
E.

Conclusion

"

In sum, President Trump entered office deeply skeptical of all
international entanglements.' 4 9 He sees states as engaged in an adversarial
battle for wealth and power, and he rejects the idea that international
relationships can be mutually beneficial. 0 He is unwilling to help others
5
and he does not care about human rights.'5
unless it directly benefits him"'
Instead, he admires authoritarian leaders who routinely abuse their citizens.
More importantly for this Article, in his view, international law is
imposed on the United States by others to weaken the U.S. and limit its

144 Montanaro, supra note 136.

145 Id.
146 See Neil MacFarquhar, After Annexing Crimea, Euphoric Russia Turns Thoughts to Ukraine,

N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/after-annexingcrimea-euphoric-russia-turns-thoughts-to-ukraine.html; see also Thomas D. Grant, Annexation of
Crimea, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 68 (2015) (arguing that Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea violated
international law); Jure Vidmar, The Annexation of Crimeaand the Boundaries ofthe Will ofthe People,

16 GERMAN L.J. 365 (2015) (arguing that, while secession is not automatically unlawful, Russia's use
of force to procure the secession of Crimea was unlawful and noting that Russia's annexation of Crimea
was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly and would have been condemned by the
Security Council but for a Russian veto).
147 See Russia: Events of 2019, HUM. RTS. WATCH (last visited Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/mssia; see also Ziv et al., supra note 99, at

1002 (noting President Trump's "warm relationship" with Putin despite the latter's lengthy record of
human rights violations).
148 See Cilizza & Brenna, supranote 129; Montanaro, supra note 136; Krishnadev Calamur, Nine

Notorious Dictators, Nine Shout-Outs From Donald Trump, ATLANTIC

(Mar.

4, 2018),

https://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2018/03/trump-xi-jinping-dictators/554810/.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 103-108, 123-127; see also Koh, supra note 1, at 467
(noting that President Trump's "'America First' strategy ... grimly views our interactions with the world
as zero-sum").

151 See supra text accompanying notes 104, 116.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 128-148.
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power.1 53 This leads him to distrust international law"' and seek to free the
United States from its limitations. 55 Thus, he is predisposed to reject the
limitations on the United States' ability to use military force imposed by
IHL.
V. THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON VIOLENCE

A central tenet of IHL is that the right to use armed force is limited.1 56
Although certain uses of force are permitted during armed conflicts, military
necessity cannot justify acts "such as cruelty or wanton violence."'
IHL
treats violence as necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, but
still ultimately inhumane, and limits the use of violence that is not
necessary.15 8
This view of violence, embodied in the principles of distinction and
humanity, stands in contrast to the President's public statements about
violence. In those statements, the President advocated for and praised the
use of violence. In one of his most famous statements, the President claimed
that he could "stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody"
and not lose any voters because his supporters were so loyal,159 but this is
far from his only statement that encourages or endorses violence. As
explained below, he has called for the use of violence against protesters, the

153 See supra text accompanying notes 101-102; see also infra text accompanying notes 201-202.

It is worth pointing out that this belief, which underlies so much of President Trump's hostility to
international law, is almost completely wrong. Most of the present international order was created by
the United States for its own (and others') benefit. See MICHAEL J. MAZARR, MIRANDA PRIEBE,
ANDREW RADIN & ASTRID STUTH CEVALLOS, UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ORDER

iii (Rand Corporation 2016) (noting that "[s]ince 1945, the United States has pursued its global interest
through creating and maintaining international economic institutions, bilateral and regional security

organizations, and liberal political norms; these ordering mechanisms are often collectively referred to
as the internationalorder"); see also id. at 7-29 (describing the role of the United States in building the
modern international order and explaining how this benefited the United States).
154 See supra text accompanying note 101 (noting his skepticism of international law and
institutions).
155 See supra text accompanying note 102; see also supra text accompanying notes 110-111. More
generally, he has tried to withdraw the United States from a host of international agreements and
institutions. See supra text accompanying notes 118-127.
156 See Hague Convention II of 1899, supra note 49, art. 22 ("The right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 8, § 2.6.2.1 (noting that "parties to a conflict must accept that certain limits exist on their
ability to conduct hostilities").
157 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, § 2.3.1.

158 Id.
159 See Mary Troyan, Trump: I Could Shoot a Person and Not Lose Votes, USA TODAY (Jan. 23,
2016, 3:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/01/23/trump-could-

shoot-person-and-not-lose-votes/79232258/.
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press, and his political enemies. Taken collectively, these statements show
that President Trump both idolizes and glorifies violence and views it as a
tool to get what he wants.
A.

Violence Against Protesters

Some of the most striking examples of the President's violent language
have been his repeated calls for his supporters to attack protesters.160 At a
rally in Iowa, in February 2016, he both encouraged members of the
audience to attack protesters ("knock the crap out of them, would you?")
161
and promised he would pay their legal fees if they did attack protesters.
162
Later in
A similar incident occurred in Michigan that same month.
with a
gentle
too
being
were
guards
that
security
February, he complained
protester they were removing from a rally: "I'd like to punch him in the face,
I'll tell you." 163 On several occasions he has said he misses "the good old
days" when protesters would be beaten by the crowd.1 ' For example, at
one rally he lamented that "[w]e're not allowed to punch back anymore"
and said that he "love[d] the old days" when protesters would have been
Unsurprisingly in light of his
"carried out on a stretcher." 65
66
encouragement, Trump supporters have attacked protesters at rallies.'
More recently, President Trump has endorsed violence against those
protesting the police killing of George Floyd, a Black man. As some protests
resulted in violence, President Trump called the protesters "THUGS,"
threatened to "send in the National Guard & get the job done right," and

160 See Eric Levitz, Donald Trump Misses the Old Days When You Were Allowed to Beat Up
Protesters, INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 23, 2016), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/02/trump-onprotester-id-like-to-punch-his-face.html; German Lopez, Don't Believe Donald Trump Has Incited
Violence
at
Rallies?
Watch
This
Video,
vox
(Mar.
12,
2016),

https://www.vox.com/201 6/3/12/11211 846/donald-trump-violence-rallies.
161 See Libby Cathey & Meghan Keneally, A Look Back at Trump Comments Perceived by Some
as Encouraging Violence, ABC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/back-trump-

comments-perceived-encouraging-violence/story?id=
throw a tomato, knock the crap out of them, would
promise you I will pay for the legal fees. I promise, I
162 Id. (quoting Mr. Trump as saying "Get [the

6
8 4 1576 ("If you see somebody getting ready to
you? Seriously, OK? Just knock the hell ... I
promise.").
protester] out. Try not to hurt him. If you do, I'll

4

defend you in court. Don't worry about it.").

163 1d.
164 See Robert Mackey, Trump Concerned His Rallies Are Not Violent Enough, INTERCEPT (Mar.
11, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/03/11/trumps-good-old-days-when-battering-protesters-wascelebrated-in-the-white-house/.
165 Id.
166 See Alana Abramson, Donald Trump Rally Videos Show Protester Getting Punched, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 10, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-rally-videos-show-protesterpunched/story?id=37551524; Mackey, supra note 164.
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warned "when the looting starts, the shooting starts." 67 President Trump's
tweet was widely understood as calling for the police and military to shoot
Black protesters.'6' Twitter, which recently began labeling tweets that
increase the "potential for likely harm,"1 69 responded by labeling the
President's tweet as "glorifying violence."1 7 0 The very next day, the
President threatened protesters outside the White House with attacks by "the
most vicious dogs" and the "most ominous weapons."171 Shortly after
threatening the use of violence against protesters, the President did use
excessive and unnecessary force against protesters in Lafayette Square in
Washington, DC.1 72 He has also tacitly endorsed police violence against
protesters in other cities.' 73

167 See Davey Alba, Kate Conger & Raymond Zhong, Twitter Adds Warnings to Trump and White
House
Tweets,
Fueling
Tensions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
29,
2020),

&

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/technology/trump-twitter-minneapolis-george-floyd.html.
The
phrase "when the looting starts, the shooting starts" is associated with a former Miami police chief,
Walter Headley, when he threatened in 1967 to open fire on Black protesters. See Maggie Haberman
Alexander Bums, Trump's Looting and Shooting Remarks Escalate Crisis in Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES
(May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/politics/trump-looting-shooting.html; see

also Barbara Sprunt, The History Behind 'When The Looting Starts, The Shooting Starts', NPR (May
29, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/29/8648 18368/the-history-behind-when-the-looting-starts-theshooting-starts. Chief Headley added that "[w]e don't mind being accused of police brutality." See
Haberman & Burns, supra.
168 See Haberman & Bums, supra note 167 (describing President Trump's tweet as a "threat to
have unruly protesters shot").

169 Sherisse Pham, Twitter Says It Labels Tweets to Provide 'Context, Not Fact-Checking', CNN
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/tech/twitter-enforcementpolicy/index.html.
BuSINESS (June 3, 2020, 5:13

170 See Peter Baker et al., supra note 167.
171 See Maggie Haberman, Trump Threatens White House Protesters with 'Vicious Dogs' and
'Ominous
Weapons',
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
30,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/politics/trump-threatens-protesters-dogs-weapons.html.

172 Philip Rucker & Ashley Parker, Lafayette Square Clash, Still Reverberating,Becomes an Iconic
Episode in Donald Trump's Presidency, WASH. POST (June 13, 2020, 6:30 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lafayette-square-clash-still-reverberating-becomes-an-

iconic-episode-in-donald-trumps-presidency/2020/06/13/9ddcc348-acb8-l
e69bd6520940_story.html.

ea-9063-

173 Jordyn Phelps & Libby Cathey, Trump Tweets Conspiracy Theory About Buffalo Protester

Police

Officers

Knocked

to

Ground,

ABC

NEWS

(June

9,

2020,

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-tweets-conspiracy-theory-buffalo-protester-police-

officers/storyid=71150154.
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Violence Against the Press

The President has advocated violence against the press on a number of
occasions. 17 4 For example, in December 2015, he seemed to suggest that
murdering journalists might be acceptable.1 7 5 While discussing the murder
of dissident journalists in Russia, then-candidate Trump said "I would never
kill them."17 6 Then he paused and seemed to reconsider: "Ahhh . . . let's
see . . . well . . . no, I wouldn't. I would never kill them. But I do hate
them." 17 7 Then, in 2017, Representative Greg Gianforte attacked a reporter
who was asking him questions.1 78 Trump praised the representative, saying:
"Any guy that can do a body slam, he is my type!" 7 9 That same year, he
tweeted a video clip that depicted him tackling and repeatedly punching
80
More
someone, but with the CNN logo placed over that person's face.1
generally, he has suggested that violence against the press is a logical and
acceptable response to their critical coverage of him,'81 and he has
repeatedly labeled the press the "enemy of the people." 8 2 The result,
unsurprisingly, has been violence directed against the press by Trump
supporters.' 83
C.

Violence by Law Enforcement

President Trump has frequently argued that law enforcement personnel
should be more violent. For example, in a speech to police officers in July
2017, the President said: "Please don't be too nice. When you guys put
somebody in the car and you're protecting their head you know, the way

174 See Jonathan Chait, Trump isn't Inciting Violence by Mistake, But on Purpose. He Just Told
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 5, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/l/trump-isnt-incitingviolence-by-mistake-he-just-told-us.html.
US,

175 Aaron Rupar, One Video Refutes Sarah Sanders's Claim that Trump Has Never Encouraged

Violence, Vox (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.vox.com/20 19/2/22/1823651 2/christopher-hasson-sarahsanders-trump-encouraging-violence.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See Cathey & Keneally, supra note 161.

179 Id.
180 See Charlie May, Trump's Media Takedown Goes Meta: President Tweets Ludicrous WWE
Video - But Why?, SALON (July 2, 2017, 6:01 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/07/02/trumps-mediatakedown-goes-meta-president-tweets-ludicrous-wwe-video-mdash-but-why/.
181 See Chait, supra note 174.
182 See Brett Samuels, Trump Ramps Up Rhetoric on Media, Calls Press 'The Enemy of the

People', HILL (Apr. 5, 2019, 2:21 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/437610-trumpcalls-press-the-enemy-of-the-people.
183 See Bodyslams, Bombs and Shoves: Anti-Media Violence in Trump'sAmerica, AXIOS (Feb. 12,
2019), https://www.axios.com/violence-against-media-bombs-shootings-trump-a59584cb-ac2c-4813bfef-7b3a4233690d.html (describing violence directed against the media at Trump rallies and by Trump
supporters).
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you put their hand over [their head] .... You can take the hand away,
OK?"' 84 He also complained that the laws provided too little protection for
police officers and too much protection for the rights of those accused of
crimes.'85 He has made similar comments about police violence at rallies,
where he has claimed that law enforcement personnel were too afraid to use
force against protesters and waxed nostalgically about the "old days" when
law enforcement would have "rip[ped the protester] out of his seat." 8 6 In
2018, during a roundtable on tax reform, President Trump praised
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers for being violent:
"And these ICE guys are so much tougher than them, and they're grabbing
[illegal immigrants] by the necks and throwing them into paddy wagons.
And . . . the people are clapping and screaming."187 As noted above, the
President has also approved of police violence aimed at peaceful
protesters.1 88
D. Using Violence to Maintain Power

-

Finally, the President has implied his supporters could use violence to
help him become President and keep him in power. Shortly before the 2016
presidential election, he suggested that his supporters might use violence if
he did not win the presidency.1 89 Talking about what might happen if
Hillary Clinton became President, he said: "If she gets to pick her judges,
nothing you can do folks .... Although the Second Amendment people
maybe there is, I don't know."' 90 Most people saw his words as a suggestion
that his supporters might assassinate Hillary Clinton if she won the
Presidency.19' Then, in 2018, he warned his political opponents: "I have the
support of the police, the support of the military, the support of Bikers for

184 See Cathey & Keneally, supra note 161.
185 Id. ("I have to tell you, you know, the laws are so horrendously stacked against us, because for
years and years, they've been made to protect the criminal .... Not the officers. You do something
wrong, you're in more jeopardy than they are.").
186 See Mackey, supra note 164.
187 See Donald J. Trump, President, U.S., Remarks by President Trump at a Roundtable Discussion
on Tax Reform (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-roundtable-discussion-tax-reform/.
188 See supra Section V.A.
189 See Nick Corasaniti & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Suggests 'Second Amendment
TIMES
(Aug.
9, 2016),
Against Hillary Clinton, N.Y.
People' Could Act
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/1 0/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html.

190 Id.
191 Id. The President later suggested that he was just encouraging gun rights supporters to vote for
him, but it is worth noting that his explanation does not make sense. He was discussing what might
happen after Hillary Clinton became President and she could nominate judges to the federal bench, not
how to prevent her from becoming President. Id.
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Trump - I have the tough people but they don't play it tough - until they go
to a certain point, and then it would be very bad, very bad."' 92 His words
echo earlier statements in which he said that his opponents were lucky that
his supporters were peaceful, but also suggested that violence might be
necessary if he did not get his way.193
E.

Conclusion

The President's divisive rhetoric and support for violence has inspired
real violence.1 94 Dozens of people who have engaged in violent acts against
those presumed to be anti-Trump, including protestors, members of the
LGBT community, immigrants, and non-whites, claimed that President
Trump condoned or inspired their actions. 195 It is unusual for a President's
words to inspire such violence. 196 Yet, despite the high levels of violence
his rhetoric inspires, President Trump has refused to take any responsibility
for the consequences. 197
President Trump's own words reveal a lot about how he views violence.
He glorifies violence ("I'd like to punch him in the face, I'll tell you"). He
is nostalgic for a past ("the good old days") when indiscriminate violence
was permitted, and he thinks that law enforcement should be able to use
more violence against suspects ("[grab] them by the neck and throw[] them
into paddy wagons"). Finally, he sees violence as an acceptable tool to keep
those he does not agree with, including protesters, the press, and his political
opponents, in their place. Given his glorification of violence, it is likely that
he finds the constraints of IHL, with its emphasis on reducing unnecessary
violence and suffering, to be too restrictive.

192 Justin Wise, Trump Suggests that It Could Get 'Very Bad' IfMilitary, Police, Biker Supporters
Play 'Tough', HILL (Mar. 14, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/434110-trumpsuggests-that-things-could-get-very-bad-if-military-police; see also Chait, supra note 174.

193 Wise, supra note 192.
194 See, e.g., Samira Saramo, The Meta-Violence of Trumpism, 12 EUR. J. AM. STUD. 1 (2017)
(discussing the links between President Trump's violent rhetoric and actual violence).
195 See Jone Swaine & Juweek Adolphe, Violence in the name of Trump, GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2019/aug/28/in-the-name-of-tmmp-supportersattacks-database (cataloging more than fifty instances of pro-Trump violence directed against

immigrants, non-whites, protestors, LGBT people, and journalists); Mike Levine, 'No Blame?' ABC
News Finds 36 Cases Invoking 'Trump' in Connection with Violence, Threats, Alleged Assaults, ABC

NEWS (Aug. 14, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/blame-abc-news-finds-17-cases-invokingtrump/story?id=58912889.
196 See Levine, supra note 195 (noting that ABC News was unable to find a single criminal case
where an act of violence was done in the name of President Barack Obama or President George W.
Bush).
197 Id. (noting that President Trump has refused to take any responsibility for the violence
associated with his supporters).
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VI. THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

This Article now turns to President Trump's views about IHL. It will
begin with a discussion of his views about IHL generally and then move on
to his comments about particular aspects of IHL. Together, these statements
provide a good indication of the President's views on IHL.
A.

General Views on IHL

President Trump has never articulated a clear vision of IHL but he has
made a number comments that shed light on his general beliefs about it. 198
In those comments, he has repeatedly railed against the need to follow the
laws of war. For example, he complained the U.S. fights "very politically
correct" wars' 99 and argued that it was necessary for the U.S. to use the same
methods as its enemies: "We have to play the game the way they're playing
the game. You're not going to win if we're soft and . . . they have no
rules." 200 He has also described the rules that the U.S. follows as a source
of weakness 20' and has claimed that our willingness to follow IHL makes
the United States "weak" and "stupid." 2 02
His general comments about IHL are consistent with his views on both
violence and international law. He rejects attempts to use law to restrict
what he can do and sees international law as being imposed on the U.S. to
weaken it. 203 At the same time, he favors using violence to solve

198 None of the comments discussed below mention international humanitarian law by name, but
they take positions on issues that relate to IHL. Thus, whether knowingly or not, President Trump has

taken positions on IHL.
199 See Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump on Terrorists: 'Take Out Their Families', CN, (Dec. 3,
2015),

https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/index.html.

This

comment echoes his comments about the use of violence by the police in the United States, where he
has complained that the ability of law enforcement to use force is unnecessarily constrained by

"politically correct" rules. See Mackey, supra note 164 ("You see, in the good old days, law enforcement
acted a lot quicker than this . . . In the good old days, they'd rip him out of his seat so fast. But today,
everybody's politically correct. Our country's going to hell with being politically correct."); see also

supratext accompanying notes 184-186.
200 See Jeremy Diamond, Trump on Torture: 'We Have to Beat the Savages', CNN (Mar. 6, 2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/06/politics/donald-trump-torture/index.html. When the President said
that the U.S. has to play the game the way our enemies are playing it, he was talking about torturing our
enemies. Id.

201 Id.
202 See Ashley Parker, In 'Good Old Days, 'Donald Trump Says, Campaign ProtestersGot More
Than Just an Escort Out, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/firstdraft/2016/02/27/in-good-old-days-donald-trump-says-campaign-protesters-got-more-than-just-anescort-out/ ("We can't talk about waterboarding, so they must think we are so weak and so stupid.").
203 See supra Section IV.
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problems. 204 Given that IHL is a series of international rules designed to
regulate and limit violence, it is not surprising that he rejects it. Next, this
Article will turn to specific proposals the President has made about how the
U.S. should use violence.
B.

Views on Torture

Torture, including waterboarding, has been illegal since at least the
1860s. 20s Torture is banned by the Geneva Conventions, 2` the Convention
Against Torture, 2 07 and customary international law. 208 Torture is also a war
crime 2 09 and states have an obligation to prosecute individuals who engage
in torture during armed conflicts. 210 The U.S. government's official position
is consistent with international law. The U.S. Department of Defense's Law
of War Manual clearly recognizes that interrogation of detainees "must be
carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements for humane
treatment, including the prohibition against torture."21 U.S. law specifically
prohibits the use of waterboarding.212
Despite this prohibition, President Trump has repeatedly argued the U.S.
should torture people. As a candidate, he claimed that he would "bring back
a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding."213 He reiterated that position
twice in February 2016. First, at a campaign rally in mid-February, he said
waterboarding was "[a]bsolutely fine. But we should go much stronger than

204 See supra Section v.
205 See LIEBER, supra note 44, Rule 16 (forbidding the use "of torture to extort confessions").
206 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, arts. 129-30 (noting that certain "grave
breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, including the use of torture, must be criminalized and that states
have an obligation to prosecute torture committed during armed conflicts).
207 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (obliging all states to criminalize torture).
208 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 7, Rule 90 ("Torture, cruel or inhuman
treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, are

prohibited.").
209 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
210 The prohibition on torture is contained in the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, which require states not just to prevent grave breaches but also to prosecute those who
engage in them. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, arts. 129-30.
211 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, § 8.4.1.

212 U.S. law prohibits any interrogation technique that is not permitted by Army Field Manual 222.3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-2; see also Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 13491 (2009) (entitled
"Ensuring Lawful Interrogations"). Army Field Manual 2-22.3 specifically prohibits waterboarding. See
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS

§ 5.75

(2006) (noting that "waterboarding" is specifically prohibited).
213 See Tom McCarthy, Donald Trump: I'd Bring Back 'A Hell of a Lot Worse than
https://www.theguardian.com/us2016),
7,
(Feb.
GUARDIAN
Waterboarding',
news/2016/feb/06/donald-trump-waterboarding-republican-debate-torture.
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waterboarding." 2 4 Later that same month, he reiterated his position, saying
that waterboarding was "just fine" and "frankly, if you want to go a step
above, or two or three steps above, that's O.K. with me. . .. "215 He was
harshly criticized for that position. 2 16 Numerous senior retired military
officers pointed out that waterboarding is illegal and that members of the
U.S. military would be obligated to refuse such a manifestly illegal order. 217
Then-candidate Trump quickly backtracked and released a formal
statement 218 saying that he understood he would be "bound by laws and
treaties" if he became President and that he would not "order our military
or other officials to violate those laws. . .. "219 His official contrition was
short-lived, however, and he was soon back to arguing that he would torture
terrorists: "waterboarding is absolutely fine, but we should go much
further." 220 Once he was elected, President Trump reaffirmed that he
thought torture "absolutely" works and that the U.S. had to "fight fire with
fire." 221 Although it is irrelevant to whether torture is legal, it is worth
pointing out that President Trump's justification for waterboarding and
other methods of torture (they "work" 222) is not true.223
President Trump has equivocated about whether waterboarding is
torture. At times he has claimed that, while "some people" consider

214 See Chris Deaton, Trump: 'Torture Works, OK Folks?', WASH. EXAM'R (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/trump-torture-works-ok-folks.
215 See Parker, supra note 202.
216 See Brown & Gaouette, supra note 96.

217 Id.
218 Again, it is worth noting the incongruence between the statements released on his behalf and
the President's public statements. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98 (noting that the President's

official statements are a less reliable indicator of his beliefs than this off-the-cuff statements).
219 See Brown & Gaouette, supra note 96.

220 See Diamond, supra note 200, at 00:29.
221 See Matthew Weaver & Spencer Ackerman, Trump Claims Torture Works But Experts Warn

of Its 'PotentiallyExistential' Costs, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jan/26/donald-trump-torture-absolutely-works-says-us-president-in-first-televisioninterview (claiming that torture "absolutely" works). This is not the only time President Trump has
claimed that torture is effective. See Ali vitali, Donald Trump: 'Torture Works', NBC NEWS (Feb. 17,
(noting
2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/donald-trump-torture-works-n520086
that candidate Trump said "Don't tell me it doesn't work .... Torture works.").
222 See supra note 221.

223 See S. REP. NO. 113-288, at xi (2014) (the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found in its
Intelligence Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that, "based on a review
of CIA interrogation records . . . the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was not an
effective means of obtaining accurate information or detainee cooperation."); see also Shane O'Mara,

Torturing the Brain: On the Folk Psychology and Folk Neurobiology Motivating 'Enhanced and
Coercive InterrogationTechniques', 13 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIs. 497 (2009) (concluding that torture
is unlikely to be effective); Mary Lowth, Does torture work?: Donald Trump and the CIA, 67 BRIT. J.

GEN. PRAC. 126 (2017) (concluding that the available evidence shows that torture does not work).
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waterboarding to be torture, others do not. 2 4 On another occasion, he
described waterboarding as "the least form of torture." 2 5 But there is little
doubt about its status. Torture is defined as the imposition of "severe
physical or mental pain or suffering" for the purpose of obtaining
information or a confession, as punishment, to intimidate or coerce, or for
any other discriminatory purpose. 2 26 Waterboarding, as practiced by the
CIA in its secret detention facilities, "was physically harmful, inducing
convulsions and vomiting." 227 It was described in internal CIA reports as a
"series of near drownings" which left one person "completely unresponsive,
with bubbles rising through his open full mouth." 2 28 Waterboarding and
other "enhanced interrogation techniques" also have severe long-term
effects on their victims. 229 Those who have evaluated the technique have
found it to constitute torture. 230
Waterboarding is both a violation of IHL and a war crime 2 1 and
President Trump is aware that it is illegal. 232 Indeed, he has said that even
knowing it is illegal, he would do it anyway.2' On multiple occasions he
has proposed going "much further" than waterboarding though it is not clear

224 See Parker, supra note 202.
225 See Tessa Berenson, DonaldTrump Repeats Offensive Namefor Ted Cruz at Rally, TIME (Feb.

8, 2016), https://time.com/4213231/donald-trump-ted-cruz-pussy/.
226 See INT'L CRIM. CT., ELEMENT OF CRIMES art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1; see also Convention Against

Torture, supra note 207, art. 1.
227 See S. REP. No. 113-288, supra note 223, at xii-xiii.
228 Id.
229 See O'Mara, supra note 223, at 498 (noting various studies that have shown that people
subjected to torture show long-term effects in brain functioning, including effects on memory); id. at
499 ("[T]hese techniques cause severe, repeated and prolonged stress, which compromises brain tissue
supporting memory and executive function.").

230 See, e.g., id., Dianne Feinstein, Forewordto S. REP. No. 113-288, at vii (2014) ("While the
Office of Legal Counsel found otherwise between 2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion that,
under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured .. .. I believe the evidence of this
is overwhelming and incontrovertible."); see also U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm'r for Hum.
Rts., Torture is Torture, and Waterboarding Is Not an Exception - UN Expert Urges the US Not to

Reinstate
It
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsD=21129&Lang[D=E
(quoting the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture as saying "Without any doubt, waterboarding
amounts to torture"); M. Katherine B. Darmer, Waterboarding and the Legacy of the Bybee-Yoo

"Torture and Power" Memorandum: Reflections from a Temporary Yoo Colleague andErstwhile Bush
Administration Apologist, 12 CHAP. L. REv. 639 (2009) (concluding that waterboarding was torture);
Georgina Druce, Does WaterboardingConstitute Torture?, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 351 (2008) (examining
the legal elements of torture and concluding that waterboarding is torture).

231 See supra text accompanying notes 205-212, 226-230.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 224-225 (noting that Trump has acknowledged, at least
sometimes, that waterboarding is torture, even though he also sometimes claims that this conclusion is

open to debate).
233 See Deaton, supranote 214 ("Some people say that it's not actually torture. Let's assume it is.
But they asked me the question, what do you think of waterboarding? Absolutely fine. But we should
go much stronger than waterboarding.").

2021]

DON QUIXOTE OR DARTH VADER?

75

what he means. 23 4 Given that waterboarding is torture, any interrogation
technique that goes beyond waterboarding would also constitute torture. 235
As such, the President of the United States has repeatedly said that he would
like to engage in torture.
C.

Views on Collective Punishment

On several occasions, the President of the United States has argued that
the U.S. should kill the families of its enemies. 236 Combatants must always
distinguish between civilians and combatants and can never intentionally
attack civilians. 237 This is known as the principle of distinction. 2 38
Deliberate violation of the principle of distinction is a war crime. 23 9 Thus,
deliberately targeting and killing the family members of combatants would
be a war crime. 240 However, President Trump's suggestion goes beyond
violating the principle of distinction and also constitutes the war crime of
collective punishment.
In the crime of collective punishment, people or groups are punished for
the acts of others. The prohibition on collective punishment is rooted in the
fundamental principle of criminal law that nobody may be punished for a
wrong committed by someone else.2 4 1 In international law it is embodied

234 See supra text accompanying notes 213-215, 220.
235 For example, in addition to prohibiting waterboarding, Army Field Manual 2-22.3 also prohibits
hoodings, beatings, electric shocks, inducing hypothermia, depriving detainees of food, water or medical
care, and conducting mock executions. See FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Sept.

2006, at § 5.75.

&

236 See infra text accompanying notes 253-256.
237 See HENCKAERTS & DOSwALD-BECK, supra note 7, Rule 1 ("The parties to an armed conflict
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against
combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.").
238 See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
239 See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(b)(i) (noting that it is a war crime to intentionally
direct attacks against a civilian population or against individual civilians who are not taking an active
part in the hostilities).
240 There is one potential exception to this conclusion. If the family members were themselves
combatants or directly taking part in hostilities, then they could be targeted. See HENCKAERTS
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, Rule 1 ("Attacks may only be directed against combatants."); id., Rule
6 ("Civilians are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."). But President Trump's public statements make it clear he is talking about killing
noncombatants. He referred to the targets of this policy as the family members of combatants and he
suggests killing these family members not because they are directly a threat but rather to punish or deter
combatants. See supra text accompanying notes 253-257. He has also acknowledged that the victims of
this policy would include children. See supra text accompanying note 254. These statements make it
clear he was talking about deliberately targeting noncombatants.
241 See Shane Darcy, Prosecutingthe War Crime of Collective Punishment, 8 J. INT'L CR1M. JUST.

29, 31 (2010).
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in the Fourth Geneva Convention, which says that "[n]o protected person
may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed.
Collective penalties and likewise all measure of intimidation or of terrorism
The prohibition was also incorporated into the
are prohibited." 2 42
243
While collective punishment may have been
Additional Protocols.
permissible in the distant past, 244 it is now banned as a matter of customary
international law in both international and non-international armed
conflicts. 24 5 It is also prohibited by the U.S. Department of Defense.2 4 6
In addition to being a violation of international law, the imposition of
collective punishment is a war crime. 247 It was included as a war crime
24 8
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,24 and has resulted in several
There is no specific provision related to collective
convictions. 2 0
punishments in the Rome Statute, 25 1 but the International Criminal Court
would probably prosecute it as another violation of international criminal

law. 252
In December 2015, then-candidate Trump argued that the best way to
deal with members of ISIS was to kill their families: "The other thing with
the terrorists is you have to take out their families, when you get those

242 See Geneva Convention IV, supranote 5, art. 33.

243 See Protocol I, supra note 59, art. 75(2)(d) (prohibiting "collective punishments"); Protocol II,
supranote 59, art. 6(2)(b) (prohibiting conviction or punishment "except on the basis of individual penal
responsibility").
244 See Shane Darcy, Prosecutingthe War Crime of Collective Punishment, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
29, 30 ("Faced with resistance from among a population and unable to locate insurgents responsible for
hostile acts, invading armies and occupying powers have used collective punishments in the hope of
curbing attacks and ensuring obedience, although the stated aim of deterrence has at time served as a
mere cloak for oppression and subjugation. International law has responded to this wartime practice by
progressively restricting and outlawing the practice of collective punishment."); id. at 31-32 (noting that
collective punishment appeared to be accepted in the mid nineteenth century but was outlawed by the

time of the 1899 Hague Regulations).
245 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, Rule 103 ("Collective punishments are
prohibited."); id. at 374 ("State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.").
246 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8,

§ 8.16.2.1 ("Collective
punishments are prohibited.").
247 See Darcy, supra note 244, at 34-39 (2010).
248 See S.C. Res. 955, art. 4(b) (Nov. 8, 1994) (Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda).
249 See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 3(b), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145.
250 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 290 (Special Ct. for Sierra
Leone Aug. 2, 2007) (finding Moinina Fofana guilty of Count 7 of the indictment, the war crime of
imposing collective punishments).
251 See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8; see also Darcy, supra note 244, at 35-36.

252 See Darcy, supra note 244, at 46-47. For example, as noted above, the ICC would probably
prosecute it as a violation of the principle of distinction. See supra text accompanying notes 236-240.
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terrorists, you have to take out their families."2" 3 When asked to clarify his
statement the next day, he responded that "I would do pretty severe stuff."254
He later repeated his intention to kill ISIS family members at a Republic
presidential debate in Las Vegas."' He also explained his rationale for
targeting family members: "Frankly, that will make people think, because
they may not care much about their lives, but they do care, believe it or not,
about their families' lives." 2 s' President Trump was criticized for this
position on the grounds that killing the families of ISIS members was
immoral and probably ineffective,2 ' but there is little doubt that the
President's plan to deliberately target and kill the family members of
combatants would also constitute the war crime of collective punishment.25
D. Views on the Killing of Prisoners
The President has repeatedly praised the deliberate killing of prisoners
by U.S. armed forces, despite fact that it is both a violation of IHL and a
war crime.2' The principle of distinction requires combatants to distinguish
between other combatants and civilians and prohibits deliberate attacks on
civilians, 260 but combatants are permitted to attack and kill other combatants
during the course of hostilities. 26 1 This right is not unlimited, however. IL
does not permit attacks on combatants who are hors de combat.2 62 A person
who is hors de combat is a person who is no longer participating in
hostilities. 263 When a person is hors de combat, they are no longer a

253 See Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump on Terrorists: 'Take Out Their Families', CNN (updated
Dec.

3,

2015,

12:19

PM),

https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-

families/index.html.
254 See Ryan Lizza, The Duel: The Trump and Cruz CampaignsEmbody Opposite Views of Politics

and
the
Future
of
the
G.O.P.,
NEW
YORKER
(Jan.
24,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/01 /the-duel-faceoff-ryan-1izza.
255 See Emily Atkin, Trump: I Would Intentionally Kill Families to Defeat ISIS, THINKPROGRESS
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/trump-i-would-intentionally-kill-families-to-defeat-isisb5484a36a7a2/.
256 Id.
257 See, e.g., Gregory Krieg, IsraeliExpert: Trump's Call to Kill Terrorists'Families Immoral,
Ineffective, CNN (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/03/politics/donald-trump-kill-terroristfamilies-war-crime/index.html.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 241-252; see also Chilton, supra note 1 (noting that
President Trump's plan to kill the families of terrorists would be a "clear violation[] of the laws of war").

259 See infra text accompanying notes 279-283; see also Ford, supranote 18, at 776, 791-792.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
261 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, Rule 1 ("Attacks may only be directed
against combatants.").
262 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, Rule 47 ("Attacking persons who are

recognized as hors de combat is prohibited.").
263 Id. at 166. Hors de combat is a French phrase that translates as "out of the fight."
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legitimate target and cannot be attacked or killed.

'

A person who has been captured and is a prisoner in the power of an
adverse party is hors de combat.2" Consequently, it is forbidden to attack
or kill prisoners, even if they are combatants. This prohibition is at the heart
of IL and is embodied in the Third Geneva Convention, which establishes
a complex set of rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war.2 65 Thus,
parties to the Geneva Conventions are required to treat all persons who are
prisoners of war "humanely" and they "must at all times be protected,
26 6
Violation of these
particularly against acts of violence or intimidation."
prohibitions, particularly the deliberate killing of prisoners of war, is a grave
26
8
This is true in
breach of the Convention2 67 and constitutes a war crime.
269
prohibition
The
conflicts.
armed
and
non-international
both international
rule of
a
long-standing
is
on killing combatants who are hors de combat
customary international law which has existed since at least the time of the
Lieber Code. 270 Today, there is no doubt that the intentional killing of
persons who are hors de combat is both a violation of IHL and a war
crime. 27
Despite this prohibition on the killing of prisoners, the President has
praised U.S. soldiers for executing prisoners. He even pardoned a soldier
2 72
who was charged with murder for deliberately killing a prisoner. Major
Mathew Golsteyn and another soldier took a prisoner off the base in
Afghanistan where he was being held and Major Golsteyn intentionally

264 There are three main ways a person can become hors de combat:

1) when they are in the

power

of an adverse party; 2) when they are defenseless due to injuries; and 3) when they give a clear expression
of the intent to surrender. Id., Rule 47.
265 See generally Geneva Convention

Ill, supranote 4.

266 Id., art. 13.
267 Id. art. 130 (noting that willful killing of a person protected by the Convention is a grave
breach).
268 Id., art. 129 (obligating parties to the Convention to criminally prosecute grave breaches).
269 While the Geneva Conventions apply primarily in international armed conflicts, even in noninternational armed conflicts, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires parties to treat
people who are hors de combat "humanely" and "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all

kinds" is absolutely prohibited "at any time and in any place." Id. art. 3(1). See also Protocol I, supra
note 59, art. 41; Protocol II, supra note 59, art. 4 (noting that, in non-international armed conflicts,

persons "who have ceased to take part in hostilities" must be treated "humanely" and that the killing of
such persons are prohibited "at any time and in any place").
270 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at 164; see also LEBER, supra note 44,
Rule 71 ("Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy wholly disabled, or kills such
an enemy . . . shall suffer death .... ").
271 See supra text accompanying notes 267-268; see also Rome Statute, supra note 10, art

8(2)(a)(i) (prohibiting the willful killing of persons protected by the Geneva Conventions); id. art.
8(2)(c)(i) (prohibiting the murderof "persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces .... placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause.").
272 See Ford, supra note 18, at 761-762.
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killed the prisoner.2 73 They then buried the body in a shallow grave.274
Major Golsteyn admitted both that he killed the man and that the killing was
not permitted by the rules of engagement. 275 Major Golsteyn violated the
prohibition on killing those who are hors de combat. Even if the victim had
at one time been a combatant, 276 at the time he was killed he was in the
custody and control of U.S. armed forces and therefore hors de combat.
Major Golsteyn's execution of a prisoner was a war crime. 277 Major
Golsteyn was charged with premeditated murder. 278
In November 2019, before Major Golsteyn could stand trial, the
President pardoned him.279 The President described Major Golsteyn as a
"hero" for his actions 2 80 and said he did not deserve to go to jail. 281 In
October 2019, President Trump said about Major Golsteyn: "We train our
boys to be killing machines, then prosecute them when they kill!" 282 On
another occasion President suggested that prosecuting soldiers for killing
people is unfair. 283

273 See Helene Cooper, Michael Tackett & Taimoor Shah, Twist in Green Beret's Extraordinary
Story: Trump's Intervention After Murder Charges, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2018),
Issuing Several
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/us/politics/major-matt-golsteyn-trump.html;
Pardons, President Trump Intervenes in Proceedings of US. Troops Charged or Convicted of Acts
Amounting to War Crimes, 114 AM. J. INT'L L. 307, 308 (2020).

274 See Cooper et al., supra note 273.
275 Id.
276 It is not clear that the victim was a combatant, although Major Golsteyn apparently believed
him to be one.
277 See generally Ford, supra note 272, Section IV.A.
278 See Cooper et al., supra note 273; see also Issuing Several Pardons, supra note 273, at 308-

309.
279 Dave Phillips, Trump Clears Three Service Members in War Crimes Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Trump
Intervenes in Military Justice Cases, Grants Pardons, VOA (Nov. 15, 2019, 9:23 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/usa/trump-intervenes-military-justice-cases-grants-pardons.
280 See Aaron Rupar, Trump's Interest in PardoningTroops Accused of War Crimes, Explained,

15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/trump-pardons.html;

Vox (May 24, 2019),

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/201 9/5/24/1 8637360/trump-war-

crimes-pardons-gallagher-golsteyn-fox-news-hegseth.
281 See Helene Cooper, Maggie Haberman & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Trump Says He Intervened

in

War

Crimes

Cases

to

Protect

'Warriors',

N.Y.

TIMES

(Nov.

25,

2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 1/25/us/politics/mark-esper-seal-navy-secretary.html.
282 Editorial Board, Opinion, The Moral Injury of PardoningWar Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/opinion/editorials/trump-gallagher-pardon-war2019),

crimes.html. This comment was made specifically about Major Golsteyn. See Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Oct.
12,
2019,
10:49
PM),
ttps://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/ 183016899589955584.
283 When President Trump first indicated he might pardon Major Golsteyn and several other
soldiers accused of war crimes, he described them as soldiers that "have fought hard and long," and said
"You know, we teach them how to be great fighters, and then when they fight sometimes they get really
treated very unfairly." See Associated Press, supra note 279.
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These statements demonstrate a profound misunderstanding about IHL.
Soldiers are trained to kill, and do kill, other combatants, but that use of
force is strictly circumscribed by IHL. 284 Contrary to President Trump's
claim that soldiers are trained to be "killing machines," combatants are not
permitted to kill indiscriminately. 285 In fact, they are strictly prohibited
from deliberately killing several classes of protected persons, including
prisoners.2" Killing prisoners does not make someone a hero. Rather,
intentionally killing prisoners makes a soldier a war criminal. Moreover,
2 87
President Trump's pardon of Major Golsteyn may have been a war crime.
In sum, President Trump repeatedly praised or rewarded U.S. soldiers who
violated IHL by killing prisoners.
E.

Views on Pillage

The President has repeatedly called for the United States to commit the
war crime of pillage. 288 Pillage is the "forcible taking of private property
by an invading or conquering army from the enemy's subjects." 28 9 Pillage
has been expressly forbidden for more than 150 years. The Lieber Code
29
forbids "all pillage" 290 and the Hague Regulations of 1907 do the same. 1
As envisaged in the nineteenth century, pillage applied largely to the theft
of property by individual soldiers. 2 92 By the twentieth century, however, it
29 3
was understood that governments could also engage in pillage.

284 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, Rule

1.

285 Id. Rule 1I ("Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.").
286 Id. Rule I ("The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and
combatants .... Attacks must not be directed against civilians."); id. Rule 89 (prohibiting the killing of
prisoners); see also id. Rule 47 (noting that attacking a person "who is in the power of an adverse party"

is prohibited).
287 See Ford, supra note 18, at 770-789 (arguing that the President's pardon of Major Golsteyn
could make the President guilty of a war crime under a theory of command responsibility because the
pardon violated the President's duty to ensure that serious violations of IHL are punished).
288 See infra text accompanying notes 304-312.
289 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at 185.
290 See LIEBER, supra note 44, Rule 44.

291 See Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land and its Annex, art. 28
(1907) [hereinafter Hague Convention IV of 1907] ("The pillage of a town or place, even when taken
by assault, is prohibited."); id. Art. 47 ("Pillage is formally forbidden.").
292 For example, the Lieber Code says that a "soldier, officer, or private" engaged in pillage "and
disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it" could be "lawfully killed on the spot by such
superior." See LIEBER, supra note 44, Rule 44.

293 An occupying power can collect taxes in occupied territory but cannot take the money to enrich
itself. See Hague IV of 1907, supra note 291, art. 48; see also 1 INT'L MIL. TRIBUNAL NUREMBERG,
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 239 (1947)
(noting that "under the rules of war, the economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear
the expense of the occupation, and these should not be greater than the economy of the country can
reasonably be expected to bear").
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The Nazi's pillage of the territory they occupied was famously
prosecuted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT). 294
The German government violated the prohibition on pillage when it
systematically confiscated or stole agricultural products, raw materials,
finished goods, and art from occupied countries.2 9 s The IMT held that these
acts constituted war crimes. 296 The result of the IMT Judgment was a broad
recognition that occupying powers cannot loot an occupied territory for their
own benefit. 297 Today, pillage is a war crime that is prohibited in both
international and non-international conflicts. 298 Pillage has been prosecuted
before the ICTY 299 and is included as a war crime within the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court. 3tu It is also prohibited by the U.S.
military. 301 There may be situations where military necessity warrants the
seizure of enemy property to obtain a particular military advantage, 302 but
pillage, looting and plunder are prohibited.30 3
In 2019, President Trump said he planned to seize Syria's oil once ISIS
was defeated. 304 After initially calling for pulling U.S. troops out of Syria,
he changed his mind and said that they would stay "to fight for the oil." 30 5
He then proposed "mak[ing] a deal with" an American oil company to
extract the oil for the United States. 306 In January 2020, he repeated his

294 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280,
annex to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European

Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (noting that the IMT had jurisdiction over war crimes, including
"plunder of public or private property"); see also 1 INT'L MIL. TRIBUNAL NUREMBERG, supra note 293,

at 55.
295 Id. at 239-42.
296 Id. at 295-96 (finding Rosenberg "responsible for a system of organized plunder of public and
private property throughout the invaded countries of Europe" and convicting him).
297 See Larissa Van Den Herik & Daniella Dam-De Jong, Revitalizing the Antique War Crime of

Pillage: The Potentialand Pitfalls of Using InternationalCriminal Law to Address Illegal Resource
Exploitation DuringArmed Conflict, 15 CRiM. L.F. 237, 266 (2011) ("The crime of pillage as applied
in the Nuremberg jurisprudence thus covered a very wide array of offences, without an express
distinction between being made between looting for personal gain or for the economy of the occupying

state. In this way, the Nuremberg jurisprudence significantly developed the crime of pillage beyond its
original scope.").
298 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supranote 6, Rule 52 ("Pillage is prohibited."); see also
Geneva Convention IV, supranote 5, art. 33 ("Pillage is prohibited.").

299 See Van Den Herik & Dam-De Jong, supranote 297, at 266.
300 See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(b)(xvi); id. art. 8(2)(e)(v).
301 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, § 5.17 ("Pillage is
prohibited.").
302 Id. § 5.17.2.
303 Id. § 5.17.4.1.
304 See Robin wright, Trump's Baffling Plan to PillageSyria's Oil, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trumps-baffling-plan-to-pillage-syrias-oil.

305 Id.
306 Id.
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claim to Syria's oil: "People said to me, 'Why are you staying in Syria?'
Because I kept the oil."307 Despite a State Department spokesperson saying
that "[a]ny claim that the United States is stealing oil from Syria is
completely false," President Trump reiterated that "I left the troops [in
Syria] to take the oil. I took the oil. The only troops I have are taking the

oil." 308
This is very similar to his suggestion that the United States should have
309
In 2011, he
seized Iraq's oil after toppling Saddam Hussein's regime.
said: "So, in the old days, you know when you had a war, to the victor
belong the spoils. You go in. You win the war and you take it.... You're
not stealing anything. You're taking - we're reimbursing ourselves - at
least, at a minimum ... We're taking back $1.5 trillion to reimburse
ourselves."3 1 0 In 2017, he reiterated this position. 31" At that time, he
rejected criticism that such a move would be illegal, calling the people who
claimed it would be illegal "fools." 1
If President Trump ordered the U.S. military to seize Syria's oil for the
benefit of the United States, that seizure would constitute the war crime of
313
pillage. President Trump's claim that "to the victor belong the spoils"
may have been true in the eighteenth century, but it is not true today and has
14
not been true for more than 100 years. 3

307 See David Brennan, Trump Says U.S. Troops Stayed in Syria Because I Kept the Oil,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-us-troops-syria-oil-bashar-alassad-kurds-wisconsin-rally-1482250.
308 Id.
309 See Id.; Jill Omitz, Conor Kelly & Veronica Stracqualursi, This Is What a Donald Trump
Presidency Might Look Like, ABC NEWS (June 16, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donaldtrump-presidency/story?id=31785651 (noting that Trump planned to pay for U.S. military commitments
in the Middle East by seizing Iraq's oil); Transcript:Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy
Views, supranote 103 ("I said when we left [Iraq] that we should have taken the oil.... I said take the
oil. I've been saying that for years.").
310 See Jill Ornitz et al., supra note 309.
311 See Transcript:ABC News Anchor DavidMuir Interviews President Trump, ABC NEWS (Jan.
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-abc-news-anchor-david-muir-interviews2017),
25,

president/story?id=45047602
312 Id.
313 See Wright, supra note 310.
314 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8,

§ 5.17.4.2

(noting that

pillage was common during the medieval era "but it ceased to be regarded as lawful with the widespread
adoption of standing armies at the end of the Eighteenth Century"); see also supra text accompanying

notes 290-291 (noting that pillage was prohibited in both the Lieber Code of 1863 and the Hague
Regulations of 1907).
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F. Views on Protection of CulturalHeritage
President Trump has proposed deliberately attacking cultural property,
which is a war crime. Cultural heritage sites are protected by international
law. The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property,
to which the U.S. is a party,' 15 affirms that states must "respect cultural
property" and "refrain[] from any act of hostility directed against any such
It also specifically forbids "reprisals against cultural
property." 3 16
property." 317 Attacks on cultural property are also prohibited by the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.318 The prohibition on
attacking cultural property 319 is now widely accepted to have become part
of customary international law.32 0
Moreover, the deliberate violation of this prohibition is a war crime.321
For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) prosecuted attacks on cultural property, particularly the deliberate
shelling of the historic medieval town of Dubrovnik. 322 These trials resulted
in the convictions of Lt. General Pavle Strugar and Vice Admiral Miodrag
Jokic for the crime of attacking cultural property. 323 More recently, the ICC
prosecuted Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for the deliberate destruction of
Muslim holy sites in the city of Timbuktu.324 Al Mahdi pled guilty and was

315 See List of States Parties for the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
https://ihlCROSS,
RED
COMM.
INT'L
Conflict,
Armed
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih.nsf/States.xsp?xpviewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xp_treat

of

ySelected=400 (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
316 See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supranote 63, art. 4(1). This prohibition
can be thought of as a specific application of the general principle of distinction. Cultural sites are, by
their nature, civilian objects rather than military ones. As such, they cannot be deliberately attacked
except in some very limited circumstances.

317 Id. art. 4(4)
318 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 59, art. 53; Additional Protocol I, supra note 59, art. 16.
319 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, Rule 38 ("Each party to the conflict must
respect cultural property" and "special care must be taken in military operations to avoid damage" to
cultural property).
320 Id. at 127 (noting that state practice demonstrates that the prohibition on attacks on cultural
property is "a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international
armed conflicts").

321 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(b)(ix) (prohibiting directing attacks against
"buildings dedicated to religion,
monuments").

education, art, science

or charitable

purposes, [or]

historic

322 See Serge Brammertz, Kevin C. Hughes, Alison Kipp & william B. Tomljanovich, Attacks
Against CulturalHeritageas a Weapon of War: Prosecutionsat the ICTY, 14 3. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1143,
1151-70 (2016).
323 Id. at 1158.
324 See Mark B. Ellis, The ICC'sRole in Combating the Destruction of CulturalHeritage, 49 CASE

w. J. INT'L L. 23, 24-31 (2017).
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sentenced to nine years in jail.32
In early January 2020, President Trump ordered an attack that killed a
26
Iran
senior Iranian military official - Major General Qassin Suleimani.
3 27
responded by firing missiles at U.S. troops in Iraq.
In the midst of this,
President Trump took to Twitter to threaten to attack cultural heritage sites
in Iran in retaliation for any attack on the U.S. or its forces.3 28 He later
reiterated his determination to attack Iranian cultural sites to reporters
aboard Air Force One, saying "They're allowed to kill our people.... And
we're not allowed to touch their cultural site? It doesn't work that way. "329
330
The President was immediately condemned for making the threat.
Shortly thereafter, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper acknowledged that
attacking cultural heritage sites would violate IHL and stressed that the U.S.
military would "follow the laws of armed conflict." 33 1 Thus, if the President
were to order U.S. forces to attack Iranian cultural sites in retaliation for a
military attack on U.S. forces, he would be committing a war crime.

325 Id. at 29-30.
326 See Peter Baker, Ronen Bergman, David D. Kirkpatrick, Julian E. Barnes & Alissa J. Rubin,
Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed US. and Iran to the Brink of War, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.

11,

2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/iran-trump.html.
327 See Alissa J. Rubin, Famaz Fassihi, Eric Schmitt & Vivian Yee, Iran Fires on US. Forces at
2 Bases in Iraq, Calling It
'Fierce Revenge', N.Y. TIMES (Jan 7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/world/middleeast/iran-fires-missiles-us.html.
328 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 4, 2020, 5:52 PM),
("Let this serve as a
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1213593975732527112?s=20
WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans or American assets, we have ... . targeted 52 Iranian sites

(representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level and
important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST

AND VERY HARD.").
329 See Maggie Haberman, Trump Threatens Iranian Cultural Sites, and Warns of Sanction on

Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/politics/trump-iran-culturalsites.html?searchResultPosition=3.
330 See Lara Jakes, Defenders of History Take Aim at Trump's Threat to Strike Iran's Cultural
Sites, N.Y. TIMES

(Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/trump-

cultural-sites.html?searchResultPosition=l.
331 See Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Pentagon Rules Out Striking Iranian Cultural Sites,

2020),
6,
(Jan.
TIMES
N.Y.
Trump,
Contradicting
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/politics/trump-esper-iran-culturalsites.html?searchResultPosition=1. The Defense Secretary's position is consistent with the official U.S.
position, which - along with international law -prohibits attacks on cultural property. See DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, § 5.18 (describing U.S. obligations to protect cultural
property); id. at § 5.18.5 ("In general, acts of hostility may not be directed against cultural property ...
.").
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G. Conclusion

-

So, what does this tell us about the President's views on IHL? For one
thing, the President does not understand or accept the rules of IHL, not even
the most basic ones.332 His call to kill the family members of his enemies
demonstrates that he does not understand the most important rule in IHL
the principle of distinction.333 In fact, he appears to be remarkably out of
step with the times. Torture, the killing of prisoners, and pillage have been
unlawful since the mid nineteenth century.334 Collective punishment has
been outlawed since at least 1899.33' In short, President Trump's beliefs
about IHL are at least 100 years out of date.336
He has repeatedly called for actions that are unequivocally illegal.337 His
threat to attack cultural heritage sites in Iran would be both illegal and a war
crime.338 His call to torture America's enemies would be both illegal and a
war crime. 339 His desire to pillage Syria's oil would be both illegal and a
war crime.340 His plan to kill the families of combatants would be both
illegal and a war crime. 341 Finally, he has praised the execution of prisoners,
which is both illegal and a war crime.342 Indeed, by pardoning Major
Golsteyn, who admitted to executing a prisoner, he may have already
committed a war crime. 343
President Trump's record on IHL is truly astonishing and makes him

332 This is perhaps not surprising given his lack of military experience and general disdain for
expertise. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. President Trump also appears to be ignorant about
international law more generally. See DavidBrennan, Trump's 'Ignorance'About InternationalLaw Is
'Extreme
Even
by
U.S.
Standards':
Expert,
NEWSWEEK
(Jan.
15,
2020),
https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-ignorance-intemational-law-extreme-us-standards-expert-

1482319.
333 See supra text accompanying notes 236-258.
334 See supra notes 205, 270, 290-291 (noting that torture, killing prisoners, and pillage were all

outlawed by the time of the Lieber Code in 1863).
335 See supra text accompanying notes 244-245.
336 It is worth noting that when the President has discussed the use of violence in domestic contexts,
he has often yearned for a return to the "good old days" when the use of indiscriminate violence against
ones enemies was permitted. See supra text accompanying notes 164-165.

337 See Ryan Pickrell, Trump's Threat to Destroy Iranian CulturalSites is One of Many Times
He's Supported Potential War Crimes and Atrocities, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-has-repeatedly-shown-support-for-possible-war-crimes-

atrocities-2020-1.
338 See supra Section VI.F.
339 See supra Section VI.B.
340
341
342
343

See supra Section VI.E.
See supra Section VI.C.
See supra Section VI.D.
See supra text accompanying note 287.
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unique among modem U.S. Presidents. 44 While American Presidents often
push the boundaries of IHL, 34 5 President Trump wants to get rid of IHL
3 47
entirely.34 6 He has repeatedly called for violating IHL's central tenets and
348
In the rare
has shown little awareness that his actions would be illegal.
instances where he recognizes that his actions would be unlawful, he has
said he would go ahead with them anyway. 349 No modern President has
essentially proposed doing away with IHL and reverting to a system where

344 See Pickrell, supra note 337 (quoting an expert on military law who said "I think President
Trump celebrates war crimes. He boasts of his willingness to do anything"); Andrew Sullivan, Donald
(Jan.
10,
2020),
Crimes
President,
N.Y.
MAG.
Trump
Is
the
War
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01 /andrew-sullivan-donald-trump-is-the-war-crimes-

president.html (describing President Trump as "unique in the history of the U.S." because of his
willingness to condone, threaten, and propose committing war crimes); Donald J. Guter, John D. Hutson
& Rachel VanLandingham, The American Way of War Includes Fidelity to Law: Preemptive Pardons
Break that Code, JUST SEC. (May 24, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64260/the-american-way-ofwar-includes-fidelity-to-law-preemptive-pardons-break-that-code/ (arguing that President Trump's

decision to preemptively pardon members of the military charged with war crimes is unprecedented).
345 For example, the decision by President Bush to treat Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners as unlawful
combatants was quite controversial and resulted in significant criticism. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, The

Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 370 (2004) (noting that the U.S.
decision to treat captured prisoners as unlawful combatants "has been sharply criticized by allied
govemments, inter-governmental organizations, prominent human rights and humanitarian law
organizations, and foreign courts").
346 See Brennan, supra note 332 (quoting one international law expert as saying that while past
U.S. Presidents have at least tried to justify apparent violations of international law, President Trump

"seemed to delight, both as a candidate and as president, in ignoring and even ridiculing international
law"); id. (quoting another expert as saying that President Trump is "such an anomalous figure to be
president of the United States or any other democracy that it throws a lot of the normal understanding
of appropriate behavior out of the window"); id. (quoting a third expert as saying that President Trump's
positions on international law boiled down to "We're not going to follow the law"); cf Koh, supra note
1, at 420 (noting that the "Trump approach does not value concerted efforts to translate existing legal
rules but rather claims that there are no [international] rules that bind our conduct").

347 Two of the most important prohibitions in IHL are the prohibition on killing non-combatants
and the prohibition on killing prisoners, and Trump has proposed violating both. See supra Sections
V C.-V I.D.
348 For example, he confidently claimed that the United States could legally attack Iranian cultural
sites. See supra text accompanying note 329. He was wrong. See supra text accompanying notes 315-

321, 331. He also called critics who said his pillaging of another state's oil would constitute a crime
"fools." See supra text accompanying note 312. The "fools" were right, and he was wrong. See supra
text accompanying notes 310-314.

349 For example, he admitted that even if waterboarding were illegal (which it is) he would do it
anyway. See supra text accompanying note 233.
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"might makes right"" 0 and "to the victor go the spoils.""'
While he may not understand IHL, his view on it is consistent with his
general beliefs about international law and violence. Consistent with his
attitude towards international law, he largely rejects IHL on the grounds that
it represents an attempt to undermine and weaken the United States3. 2 This
can be seen in his public comments about torture where he claimed that
following the rules that prohibit torture makes the United States "weak" and
"stupid.""3 His views on the use of violence during armed conflicts are
consistent with his views on the use of violence in domestic settings. 35 4 He
valorizes violence, particularly violence aimed at the weak or vulnerable."5
This can be seen in his calls to kill the family members of his enemies and
his praise for soldiers who have executed prisoners. 356
While President Trump does not understand IHL, he does have a
consistent worldview when it comes to law and violence. Unfortunately,
that worldview is profoundly anomalous. No modern American President
has so directly attacked the rules that govern the conduct of war. But how
successful has President Trump been in converting his beliefs about IHL
into action? That question will be explored in the next Section.

350 President Trump's views on international law and foreign policy boil down to: The United
States is powerful and can do whatever it wants. See supra Section IV. In other contexts, he has also
appeared to accept that might makes right. For example, he tacitly supported Russia's illegal annexation
of Crimea. See Nicole Gaouette, Trump Refuses to Condemn Russian Aggression Against Ukraine, CNN

(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/1

l/26/politics/russia-ukraine-trump-silence/index.html

(noting that President Trump has refused to condemn the annexation of Crimea); Krishnadev Calamur,
Donald
Trump's
Crimean
Gambit,
ATLANTIC
(July
27,
2016),
(noting that Donald Trump
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/trump-crimea/493280/
had said that if here were President he would "look[] at" recognizing Russia's annexation of Crimea);
see also Koh, supra note 1, at 415 (expressing a concern that the Trump Administration was engaged in
a "slow backsliding of our Kantian postwar system into a more cynical, Orwellian system of global
governance far less respectful of democracy, human rights, and the rule of international law"); id. at

466-67.
351 See supra text accompanying note 310 (noting that President Trump said, in connection with

seizing Iraq's oil, that "to the victor belong the spoils"); see also Joseph O'Mahoney, Trump Says that
Spoils Belong to the Victor. That's an Invitation to More War, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017, 10:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/01/trump-says-that-spoils-belongto-the-victor-thats-an-invitation-to-more-war/ (noting President Trump's use of the phrase "to the victor
belong the spoils" and comparing it to the way the Great Powers acted during the nineteenth century).
352 See supra Section VI.A.
353 See supra text accompanying notes 201-202.
354 See supra Section V.

355 This is analogous to his domestic politics, where he has demonized "others" including
immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities. See Ziv et al., supra note 99, at 1000 ("Trump's disdain for
'others' (e.g., immigrants, racial/ethnic minorities) is no state secret.").

356 See supra Sections VI.C)-VL.D.
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VII. THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT His VIEWS

President Trump has a truly radical view of IHL, one that would - if
implemented - roll back IHL by more than a hundred years. But how
357
of
successful has President Trump been in turning this radical "vision"
very
successful.
IHL into action? The answer is: not
While candidate Trump confidently boasted that he could get the U.S.
military to commit war crimes ("They won't refuse.... If I say do it, they're
going to do it."), 358 the reality is that he has been largely unable follow
through on his desire to violate IHL. For example, President Trump has
repeatedly argued in favor of torturing people, 359 but he has been unable to
engage in torture because U.S. law prohibits waterboarding as well as a
number of other forms of torture that were previously practiced by the
361
CIA.360 President Trump's administration drafted an executive order that
3 62
and reconsidering the rules
proposed re-opening CIA black sites
363
how "Congress recently
decried
While the draft
governing interrogation.
imposed further restrictions on the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency
3
to maintain an effective and lawful interrogation program," " it
nevertheless acknowledged that detainees in the custody of the United
States can never be subjected to "torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading

357 The word "vision" is in quotes here because it is not clear that President Trump has anything

as cohesive as a vision of what he thinks IHL should look like. See supra Section VI.A. Rather, he has
a consistent worldview that rejects both the rule of law and restrictions on violence. See supra Sections
IV-V. In the context of IHL, this has caused President Trump to take positions that would undermine
the central tenets of IHL. See supra Section VI.G. But it is not clear that he has a concrete plan or vision

for making changes to IHL.
358 See Victor Morton, Trump Says He'd Force U.S. Military to Commit War Crimes, WASH.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/3/donald-trump-says-hedforce-us-military-commit-war/.
359 See supra Section VI.B.
360 See supra text accompanying notes 211-212.
361 For a general description of the draft Executive Order, see Mark Mazzetti & Charlie Savage,
Leaked Draft of Executive Order Could Revive C.LA. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/executive-order-leaked-draft-national-securitytrump-administration.html; Charlie Savage, Draft Order on ISIS Detainees and Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.coninteractive/2017/02/08/us/document-Revised-draftTrump-EO-on-detainees-and-Gitmo.html (text of order).
362 The draft calls for government to "recommend to the President whether to reinitiate a program
of interrogation of high-value alien terrorist to be operated outside the United States and whether such
program should include the use of detention facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA)." Savage, supra note 361.
363 "The Secretary of Defense [in consultation with others] shall review the interrogation policies

set forth in Army Field Manual 2-22.3 of September 6, 2006, and shall make such modifications in and
additions to those policies, as consistent with the law, for the safe, lawful, and effective interrogation of
enemy combatants .... " Id. § 5.
364 Id. pmbl.
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treatment" and reiterated that all "officers, employees, and other agents of
the United States" must comply with the law. 365 The draft was immediately
criticized,366 and President Trump promptly backtracked saying that while
he believed torture worked, he would defer to his national security team in
The proposal to
deciding whether to reinstitute waterboarding. 367
reconsider interrogation tactics was never implemented. 368
President Trump was similarly unable to implement his plan to attack
Iranian cultural heritage sites. He started by saying that he had a list of
Iranian cultural heritage sites he intended to attack. 369 He followed this up
by confidently declaring such attacks would be lawful. 370 This, of course,
is wrong - attacking cultural heritage sites is both a war crime37 1 and
prohibited by the rules that govern the U.S. military. 372 The President's
statements resulted in an immediate outcry, and the U.S. Secretary of
Defense publicly stressed that such attacks would violate IHL and that the
U.S. would not attack Iranian cultural heritage sites. 373
The President also failed to implement his plans to pillage Syria's oil.
Pillage violates both international and U.S. law. 374 So, it is not a surprise
that the President was unable to turn his statements into action. The U.S.
did send troops to secure certain Syrian oil fields, but the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, carefully stressed that this was
done to prevent ISIS from recapturing them - not to seize the oil for the
U.S.37 5 In response to the President's claim that he was taking Syria's oil for
the United States, a State Department spokesperson issued a statement

365 Id. § 9.
366 See Mazzetti & Savage, supra note 361.

367 See Arlette Saenz, President Trump tells ABS News' David Muir He 'Absolutely' Thinks
Waterboarding Works, ABC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-trump-

tells-abc-news-david-muir-absolutely/story?id=45045055.
368 Parts of the draft executive order were ultimately contained in Executive Order 13823. See

Exec. Order No. 13,823, 3 C.F.R. 13,823 (Jan. 30, 2018). But Executive Order 13823 dropped the
portions of the earlier draft order that directed the administration to reconsider the limits on
interrogations. See The Trump Administration's Executive Order on Guantanamo, HUM. RTS. FIRST
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/trump-administrations-executive-order-

guantanamo.
369 See supra note 328.

370 See supra note 329.
371 See supra Section VI.F.
372 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF wAR MANUAL, supra note 8,
rules that govern the protection of cultural heritage during hostilities).

§ 5.18 (describing the

373 See Baker & Haberman, supra note 331.
374 See supra Section VI.E.

375 See David Welna, If U.S. Takes Syrian Oil, It May Violate InternationalLaws Against Pillage,
NPR (Oct. 30, 2019, 11:34 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/30/774521472/if-u-s-takes-syrian-oil-itmay-violate-international-laws-against-pillage.
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saying "any claim that the United States is stealing oil from Syria is
completely false." 376 The spokesperson went on to stress that the "Syrian
oil is for the Syrian people."37 7
President Trump's only success has been to pardon U.S. service
members accused or convicted of war crimes. 378 The President has nearly
unlimited authority to issue pardons under U.S. law. 379 Thus, the President
was able to pardon the service members despite significant opposition from
both inside and outside his administration,380 but the President's acts have
had relatively little effect on IIHL. Murdering civilians and prisoners is still
a violation of both international and U.S. law. 38' So, while the President
can pardon individual offenders, he cannot easily change U.S. law, let alone
international law. Indeed, his actions might expose him to criminal
liability. 382

Ultimately, the President has not been successful in converting his
statements about IHL into action. He has repeatedly and confidently
claimed that something was possible only to back down when it became
His
clear that his plan was both unlawful and probably criminal.
ignorance 383 and lack of a clear plan 384 have hurt him. By failing to
understand what IHL permits, he has repeatedly made statements or calls
for action that cannot be implemented without violating U.S. and
385
he
international law. By failing to have a clear plan for changing IHL,
often embarked on quixotic attacks that failed because of a lack of planning
and follow-through. 386 His failures to change IHL mirror many of his

376 See Brennan, supra note 307.

377 Id.
378 See supra Section VI.D.; see also Ford, supra note 18, at 760-764 (describing instances where

President Trump pardoned soldiers accused or convicted or war crimes).
379 See Chris Jenks, Sticking It To Yourself: Preemptive Pardonsfor Battlefield Crimes Undercut
20,
2019),
(May
SEC.
JUST
and
Military Effectiveness,
Justice
Military
https://www.justsecurity.org/64185/sticking-it-to-yourself-preemptive-pardons-for-battlefield-crimesundercut-military-justice-and-military-effectiveness/ (stating that the President possesses the power to
pardon individuals regardless of the appropriateness of the pardon); U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1 ("[The
President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States . .
."); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871) ("To the executive alone is intrusted [sic] the power
of pardon; and it is granted without limit.").

380 See Ford, supra note 18, at 767-769, 779-780.
381 See supra Section VI.D.

382 See Ford, supra note 18, at 770-789.
383 See supra text accompanying notes 332-334 (noting that President Trump's statements

demonstrate that he does not understand even the basics of IHL).
384 See supra text accompanying note 357 (noting that President Trump lacks a clear vision or plan

for how we wants to change IHL).
385 President Trump is not known for his attention to detail and careful planning. See supra note

12.
386 In answer to the question posed by the title of this Article, President Trump's ignorance,
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overall failures to change U.S. foreign policy. Both are driven by in-themoment outrage but lack any clear plan for accomplishing the changes and
fail to recognize the legal obstacles to their implementation.387
VIII. THE FUTURE OF IHL

'

What effect, if any, will President Trump have on the future of IHL? 388
At the time of writing,389 Joe Biden is projected to be the next President by
every major news network, 390 but President Trump has refused to concede3 9
and continues to pursue litigation in hopes of changing the outcome.392
Many major Republican figures have refused to recognize Joe Biden as the
winner 393 and misinformation about the election is rampant on social
media. 394 Nevertheless, it seems likely that Joe Biden will be inaugurated

inability to grapple with reality, and repeated failures make him look more like Don Quixote than Darth
Vader.

387 See Harold Hongju Koh, Trump vs. InternationalLaw: He's Not Winning, OPIMOJURIS (Feb.
10, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/02/trump-vs-international-law-hes-not-winning/ ("A pattern
has emerged whereby Trump announces that he will disrupt a previously settled relationship, the media
reacts, the allies and opponents push back, and policy resettles roughly where it was before Trump roiled
the waters. . . . So outside the headlines, key national security and defense policies continue to be made

according to longstanding legal and policy principles, often embodied in established legal and policy
frameworks embedded in congressional framework statutes, executive orders, presidential policy
guidance, and institutional custom."); Goldsmith, supra note 1 (noting that there is a "loud" way and a
"quiet" way to pull back from international law and that President Trump prefers the loud way but that
the "loud way. .. invites heightened resistance and retaliation").
388 Cf Koh, supra note 1, at 414 (noting that "[a] looming question is whether the Trump
Administration's many initiatives will permanently change the nature of America's relationship with
international law and its institutions").

389 The bulk of this Article was written in May and June 2020. This section was updated in
November 2020, shortly after the Presidential election.
390 See John Koblin, Michael M. Grynbaum & Tiffany Hsu, Tension, Then Some Tears, as TV
7,
2020),
TIMES
(Nov.
History,
N.Y.
a
Moment
for
News
Narrates
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11 /07/business/media/presidential-election-tv-networks-call.htm

(noting that CNN, NBC, ABC, CBS, the Associated Press, and Fox News all projected that Joe Biden
won the election).
391 See Emily Cochrane, Republican Congressional Leaders Remain Silent on Biden victory as

Trump

Refuses

to

Concede,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Nov.

8,

2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 11 /08/us/elections/republican-congressional-leaders-remain-silent-onbiden-victory-as-trump-refuses-to-concede.html.
392 See Jim Rutenberg, Nick Corasaniti & Alan Feuer, With No Evidence of Fraud, Trump Fails to
Make
Headway
on
Legal
Cases,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
6,
2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/

11 /06/us/politics/trump-election-voter-fraud.html.

393 See Catie Edmondson, Who's Going to Tell Him? Republicans Shy from Asking Trump to

Concede, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/]0/us/politics/republicanstrump-concede.html.
394 See, e.g., Davey Alba, False Claims that Biden 'Lost'PennsylvaniaSurge, and Tech Companies
2020),
(Nov.
10,
TIMES
N.Y.
Up,
Keep
to
Struggle
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11 /10/technology/false-claims-that-biden-lost-pennsylvania-surgeand-tech-companies-struggle-to-keep-up.html. There appears to be very little evidence of voter fraud
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as the next President of the United States in January 2021.
This means that President Trump will only be President for a few more
months. It seems unlikely that he can do much additional damage to IHL
in his remaining time in office. 395 Moreover Joe Biden's win represents a
return to normalcy for the United States. For example, Biden's campaign
website states that he will "reaffirm the ban on torture" and "[r]evitalize our
national commitment to advancing human rights and democracy around the
world."396 Thus, President Biden will likely return to many of the policies
that characterized President Obama's presidency 397 and put an end to the
assault on IHL that has occurred under President Trump.398 This means that
President Trump's effect on IHL will largely be limited to what he has
already accomplished. And, as noted above, President Trump has largely
failed in implementing his vision of IHL.99
IHL has turned out to be very resilient for several reasons.4 00 First, IHL
is deeply embedded in U.S. law, particularly the rules and regulations that
govern the U.S. armed forces. At one point, President Trump confidently
said that he could order the U.S. military to violate IHL and they would
However, that claim was based on a fundamental
comply. 401

and no evidence of systematic voter fraud that could change the outcome of the election. See Nick

Corasaniti, Reid J. Epstein & Jim Rutenberg, The Time Called Officials in Every State: No Evidence of
Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/l /10/us/politics/votingfraud.html.

395 But see Garrett M. Graff, 'I'm Absolutely Expecting Him to Do Something Weird': How Trump
Could
End
His
Presidency,
POLITICO
(Oct.
28,
2020),
(noting that the
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/28/trump-wild-transition-433025
"lame duck period is always a time when outgoing presidents feel free to stir up controversy" and that
President Trump, "a president who has spent four years demonstrating his lack of interest in norms and
practices of a democracy," might use the power of the presidency to further undermine democracy and

the rule of law); Rani Molla,

What Trump

Can Do During His Lame Duck Session, Vox (Nov. 9, 2020,

2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/1/9/21552855/trump-lame-duck-pardon-executive-order-firingtransition.
396 See The Power of America's Example: The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to
Meet the Challenges ofthe 21st Century, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/ (last

visited Jan. 12, 2021).
397 Cf id. (noting that Biden would return to "policies instituted during the Obama-Biden
administration to reduce civilian casualties"). He has also said he would restore U.S. support for NATO,
rejoin the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accord, and strengthen alliances with the United States'
traditional allies. See President-Elect Biden on Foreign Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
https://www.cfr.org/election2020/candidate-tracker/joe-biden (last updated Nov. 7, 2020).

398 Biden does not appear to have taken an explicit position on IHL generally. The closest he comes
is with his commitment to reaffirm the ban on torture. See supra text accompanying note 396.

399 See supra Section VI.
400 Having said that, it is possible that if President Trump has made a more concerted and better-

planned effort to undermine IHL, he could have done more damage. See supra text accompanying notes
383-387.
401 See Morton, supra note 358.
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misunderstanding of U.S. law. All members of the U.S. armed services are
required to comply "in good faith" with the laws of war. 402 The Department
of Defense notes that soldiers should ordinarily presume that the orders
given by superiors are lawful,4 03 but also stresses U.S. soldiers "must refuse
to comply with clearly illegal orders to commit" violations of IHL. 404 In
effect, U.S. soldiers must disobey orders that are clearly illegal.4 0 5
Most of the IHL violations discussed in this Article are clearly illegal.
There is no doubt that torturing prisoners, executing prisoners, and
deliberately targeting non-combatants are unlawful.4 06 These are not issues
where the legality is debatable. They are all clearly and firmly illegal and
have been illegal in many cases for more than a hundred years. 4 07 Thus,
members of the U.S. military would be obligated not to comply with orders
to commit such crimes.4 08 President Trump cannot simply order the U.S.
military to commit serious violations of IHL and expect it to comply.
In addition to a legal obligation to respect IHL, the U.S. military has a
strong practical commitment to IHL: "Compliance with the laws of war is
not only legally required but also in the strong self-interest of everyone
subject to the law of war. "409 According to the U.S. military, "[u]se of
indiscriminate force and excessive force is costly, highly inefficient, and a
waste of scarce resources." 4 10 The Department of Defense also notes that
the reciprocity inherent in the universal application of IHL benefits the
U.S. 411 The U.S. military also believes that violations of IHL are
counterproductive because they undermine "the political goals sought to be

§ 18.3.1.
403 Id. § 18.3.2.1.
404 Id. § 18.3.2. The regulations give, as an example of a clearly illegal order, an order "to kill
defenseless persons who have submitted to and are under effective physical control." See id. § 18.3.2.1.
402 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8,

Thus, according to the Department of Defense, all U.S. service members would be obligated to refuse
to comply with an order to kill prisoners.
405 This is analogous to the standard under international law, which requires soldiers to refuse to
comply with manifestly illegal orders. For example, under the Rome Statute, soldiers have a defense of
complying with superior orders that serves as a complete defense to criminal liability when they comply
with an order given by a superior. That defense is unavailable, however, when the order that was given
was "manifestly unlawful." See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 33(1). The effect is that soldiers are
required to refuse manifestly illegal orders and the failure to do so exposes them to criminal liability.
406 See supra Section VI. Indeed, the Department of Defense describes an order to kill prisoners as
the kind of manifestly unlawful order that must be disobeyed. See supra note 404.
407 See supra text accompanying note 334.
408 See Koh, supra note 1, at 434 (noting that several senior members of the Trump administration
who were former military officers publicly stated that they would not follow an order to commit torture).
409 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supranote 8, § 18.2.

410 Id. § 18.2.1.
411 Id. § 18.2.2 ("For example, humane treatment of enemy persons detained by U.S. forces can
encourage enemy forces to treat detained U.S. persons humanely.").
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achieved by military operations." 412 In short, the U.S. military follows IiHL
because it serves the interest of the U.S. not just because it is required by
international law.
Finally, seriously undermining the U.S. military's commitment to IHL
would require a culture change within the military. The U.S. military has a
very strong commitment to the concept of honor. 413 "Honor forbids the
resort to means, expedients or conduct that would constitute a breach of trust
"414 Honor provides the foundation of the obligation to implement and
enforce the laws of war. 415 Violating the rules of IHL would require the
military to act dishonorably. 416 Consequently, it would be hard to get the
military to comply with orders to violate IHL without fundamentally
changing the military's culture. Thus, it is little surprise that the military
has been resistant to President Trump's calls for serious violations of IHL. 41
In addition, while IHL is incorporated into domestic law in the United
States, it is fundamentally international in nature. It is formed from an
interlocking network of treaties and customary international law that has
accumulated over the last 150 years. 418 Today, most of IHL's key principles
are customary international law, 419 meaning they represent a general
practice amongst states that is accepted as law.420 This means that IHL will
remain resistant to change so long as most other states continued to treat the
core principles of IHL as law. There is no reason to believe that many states
want to embrace President Trump's vision of an international order where
might makes right. Some powerful states, like China and Russia, 421 might

412 Id.

§ 18.2.3.

413 See id. § 2.6.1 ("U.S. military canons ofpersonal conduct continue to emphasize the importance
of honor as a core value. Honor as a core value and other ethical norms continue to be vital as a medium
for the implementation of the law of war.").

414 Id. § 2.6.2.
415 Id. § 2.6.2.1.
416 See, e.g., id. § 5.9.4 (stating that it would be "dishonorable" to attack "[p]ersons who have been
incapacitated by wounds, sickness, or shipwreck").
417 As recently as July 2020, the Department of Defense reaffirmed its commitment to IHL. See

U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIR. 2311.01, LAW OF WAR PROGRAM 1 1.2(a) (July 2, 2020). In that Directive, the
Department of Defense reaffirmed that the U.S. military must "comply with the law of war during all
armed conflicts," made a specific reference to the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva

Conventions, and stressed its commitment to the principles of humanity, distinction, and proportionality.
Id.
418 See supra Section II.
419 Id.
420 ICJ Statute, supra note 64, art. 38(1)(b).
421 For example, Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea fits a "might makes right" paradigm. See
supra text accompanying notes 146, 350; see also Koh, supra note 1, at 468 (noting that "China, Russia,

and illiberal democracies like Hungary, Poland, and Venezuela are emerging not just as spoilers of, but
as active predators within, the liberal international order").
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temporarily4 22 benefit from such a system,4 23 but most states would not. 424
Consequently, it is unlikely that a critical mass of states will follow
President Trump's lead in trying to undermine the central tenets of IHL. For
these reasons, it seems unlikely that President Trump's actions will
fundamentally change the trajectory of IHL. President Trump has had a
greater impact in some other areas, 2 5 but he will not have a lasting effect
on IHL.
IX. CONCLUSION

As this Article demonstrates, President Trump does have a consistent
worldview that informs how he views IHL. While he has not articulated a
formal IHL policy,4 26 his statements and actions reflect his underlying
worldview. 427 This worldview is structured around two beliefs: (1)
international law was created and imposed on the United States by other
countries for the purpose of weakening the United States 428; and (2) violence
is heroic and praiseworthy. 4 29
These beliefs have predictable consequences when applied to IHL - a
branch of international law that limits indiscriminate and inhumane uses of
violence. First, his rejection of the constraints imposed by law generally
predisposes him to reject international humanitarian law.4" Second, his
valorization of violence causes him to reject the limitations on violence

422 See Koh, supra note 1, at 418-19 (arguing that Great Powers cannot rely simply on "hard
military or economic force" to dominate other states because they cannot sustain it and become "plagued
by external debt, national exhaustion, and internal dissension").
423 See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 1, at 459 ("There are indubitably States that would relish a
return to a global order that is a Hobbesian free-for-all, where power is the only arbiter and the strong
States dominate the weak.").
424 Id. (noting that it "took the world centuries to inch away from that model [a Hobbesian freefor-all] and towards a system of international cooperation" and that international cooperation "is the
only way to build sustainable solutions to truly international problems such as climate change, migration,
and war"); Koh, supra note 1, at 419 (arguing that "wise nations" need allies, multilateral institutions,
and international law to help them achieve their goals and noting that "most international cooperation
comes not from coercion but from joint action motivated by shared values").
425 See, e.g., Coral Davenport, What Will Trump's Most Profound Legacy Be? Possibly Climate
Damage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/l1/09/climate/trump-legacyclimate-change.html (arguing that President Trump's most enduring legacy may be making it much more
difficult to slow or reverse the effects of climate change).
426 See supra Section VI.A.
427 See supra Section VI.G.
428 See supra Section IV.

429 See supra Section V.
430 See supra Section VI.G.
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432
embodied in IHL. 431 The result is that he has consistently rejected IHL.
So, for example, he has described IHL as a set of rules that makes the U.S.
"weak" and "stupid," and he argued the U.S. should not follow "politically
correct" rules that limit the use of violence. 4 33

Consistent with his rejection of IHL, the President has proposed
434
numerous acts that would both violate IHL and constitute war crimes.
For example, the President has repeatedly said that he wants to torture
America's enemies. 435 He has also said the military should deliberately
target and kill the families of our enemies. 436 He has praised the killing of
prisoners by U.S. soldiers and pardoned several soldiers for murdering
438
prisoners. 4 37 He has threatened to attack Iranian cultural heritage sites
439
These would all be serious violations
and threatened to seize Syria's oil.
44 0
of IHL as well as war crimes.
These positions make President Trump unique amongst modern
Presidents."' No modern President has so thoroughly rejected the central
tenets of IHL - particularly the principle of distinction. This is not a
situation where academics have criticized a sitting President for pushing the
boundaries of IHL. Rather, President Trump's own administration has had
to repeatedly and publicly tell him that his proposals are illegal." 2
If there is a silver lining to President Trump's contempt for IHL, it is that
he has been largely unable to implement his proposals.44 3 This failure is
due, in part, to his own ignorance about IHL and his lack of planning and
follow-through. 4 He has consistently failed to recognize the legal and
policy obstacles he would have to overcome to get his way or develop a
coherent plan to overcome them. The only time he has been successful was
when he pardoned several U.S. service members who had been convicted
of murdering prisoners and civilians" 5 and there is reason to believe this is

431 Id.
432 See supra Section VI.
433 See supra Section VI.A.
434 See supra Section VI.

435 See supra Section VI.B.
436 See supra Section VI.C.
437 See supra Section VI.D.

438
439
440
441

See supra Section VI.F.
See supra Section VI.E.
See supra Section VI.G.
Id.

442 See supra Section VII.

443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id.
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something of a special case.44 6
NIL, like international law more
7
generally,' has turned out to be quite resilient.
The fact that President Trump's only success came with the granting of
pardons says a lot about IHL's resilience. The President has virtually
unlimited pardon power, so there were essentially no constraints on his
ability to pardon murderers and war criminals, which he did despite
significant pushback from within the military and his own administration.448
But in the other episodes described in this Article, the President has failed
to implement his proposals because IHL is deeply embedded in U.S. law.4 9
In particular, the U.S. military is committed to IHL, and most of the
President's proposals would violate the military's own rules.450 In fact, they
are so clearly illegal that U.S. law would require members of the U.S.
military to disobey the President if he ordered them to kill prisoners,
deliberately target civilians, attack cultural heritage sites, or pillage foreign
countries.4
It would require both significant changes to the rules that govern the U.S.
military as well as a very significant cultural change within the military
before the President could implement his vision of IL. 42 Neither seems
likely in the limited time the President has left.4 53 Moreover, even if he were
to successfully change U.S. law and the culture of the military to engage in
fundamental violations of IHL before January 2021, this would not
IHL is international rather than national
fundamentally change IHL. 4
455
law.
It is also customary international law, which means that it draws its
strength from the general practice of states. 4 ' A single state, even one as

446 See supra text accompanying notes 378-382 (noting that President Trump was able to succeed
in granting pardons to war criminals because of the virtually unlimited pardon authority given to the
President by the Constitution).
447 See Koh, supra note 387 (arguing that international law has been quite resilient to President
Trump's repeated attacks on it).
448 See supra Section V11.
449 See supra Section VIII.

4501d.
451 Id.
452 Id.
453 See Koh, supra note 1, at 421 (describing President Trump as a "blustering player who loudly
launches multiple ineffective initiatives to change the status quo" but who will be able to force "little
real change" and will probably eventually get "tired, exhausted, and frustrated from all the flailing
around").
454 See supra Section VIll.
455 See supra Section II.

456 Id.
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powerful as the United States, cannot easily change IHL.?

457 Cf Koh, supra note

1,

at 420 (noting that the "no single player in the transnational legal

process-not even the most powerful one-can easily discard the rules that we have been following for
some time").

